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TOMER BROUDE† 
Economic analysis and rational choice have made significant inroads into the study 
of international law and institutions in the last decade, relying upon standard 
assumptions of perfect rationality of states and decisionmakers. This approach is 
inadequate, both empirically and in its tendency toward outdated formulations of 
political theory. This Article presents an alternative behavioral approach that 
provides new hypotheses addressing problems in international law while 
introducing empirically grounded concepts of real, observed rationality. First, I 
address methodological objections to behavioral analysis of international law: the 
focus of behavioral research on the individual, the empirical foundations of 
behavioral economics, and behavioral analysis’s relative lack of parsimony. I then 
offer indicative behavioral research frameworks for three contemporary puzzles in 
international law: (a) the relative inefficiency of the development of international 
law, (b) dissent in international tribunals, and (c) target selection in armed 
conflict. Behavioral research in international law can serve as a viable, enriching 
alternative and complement to conventional economic analysis, so long as it is 
pursued with academic and empirical rigor as well as intellectual humility. 
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INTRODUCTION: A NEW AND NECESSARY AGENDA 
How can insights from cognitive psychology and behavioral economics 
be meaningfully applied to international legal issues, in all their normative 
and prescriptive dimensions? To understand the importance and potential 
impact of this question, consider the following three contemporary puzzles, 
each relating to different dimensions of international law. 
First, when—and why—does international law fail to develop, even 
when it is most needed? For four decades, global warming has been 
proclaimed the most severe crisis humanity has ever faced that can only be 
tackled through concerted international agreement and action. 
Nevertheless, concrete and effective international norms, whether 
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customary or treaty-based, fail to materialize.1 Similarly, the rise of non-state 
actors and transnational terrorism as well as new technologies of warfare 
and intelligence have significantly altered the battlefield at home and 
abroad, dramatically so since 9/11. Yet the applicable international law 
remains a series of treaties (and their acceptance as customary law) whose 
roots date back to the nineteenth century and whose latest editions are 
from the 1970s.2 This is not to say that international law in these fields has 
not adapted or developed at all, but why has it been so sluggish in these 
areas of paramount concern when it has demonstrated the capacity to 
develop quite meteorically with respect to other issues?3 
Second, how should international courts be structured? In the last two 
decades, there has been a momentous increase in the number and influence 
of international courts and tribunals dealing with issues as varied as 
international crimes and international trade. The structure of these courts 
varies, as do their respective records of quality and effectiveness.4 
Procedurally, some international courts allow dissenting opinions of judges, 
while others require a high degree of consensus among judicial 
decisionmakers coming from very different backgrounds. How have these 
differences affected judicial outcomes? Do collegial international courts 
                                                        
1 For one account of this gap, see Tomer Broude, Warming to Crisis: The Climate Change Law of 
Unintended Opportunity, 44 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 111, 126 (2013), which offers a perspective on the 
limiting effects the crisis framing of global warming has had on the development of international 
law.  
2 For overt struggles with this dissonance, see generally NEW BATTLEFIELDS, OLD LAW: 
CRITICAL DEBATES ON ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE (William C. Banks ed., 2011), and 
International Conference, New Technologies, Old Law: Applying International Humanitarian Law in a 
New Technological Age, HEBREW U. JERUSALEM (2011), available at http://law.huji.ac.il/eng/ 
merkazim.asp?cat=2355&in=2229, which explore the challenges to international humanitarian law 
posed by non-state armed groups’ ability to exploit the shortcomings of stagnant legal 
frameworks. 
3 For example, the right to self-determination would have been virtually incomprehensible to 
international lawyers in the late 1940s, but only twenty years later it had been elevated to the 
highest degree of international normativity. See SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN HISTORY 178-79 (2010) (describing the years following World War II as “a 
breakthrough period for human rights . . . [that] led international lawyers to reevaluate their long-
confirmed positions” on the right to self-determination). In other areas, commentators have 
argued that customary law can be created almost instantly through formally non-binding 
resolutions of international institutions. See, e.g., Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer 
Space: “Instant” International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 23, 24-25 (1965) (providing an 
example of an international guidance resolution that was treated as binding).  
4 See Yuval Shany, No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New 
International Judiciary, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 73, 79-80 (2009) (comparing new international courts 
to the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of International Justice).  
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stifle the development of international law? Or do fragmented benches 
hinder it?5 
Third, how should military attacks be conducted? Under international 
humanitarian law, military commanders contemplating an armed attack 
must follow a principle of proportionality, comparing the potential damage 
to non-combatants with the military advantage gained from the attack. 
What does this mean when viewed ex ante? How do reasonable, good faith 
military commanders understand and execute this norm in practice? And 
conversely, how should this practice affect the norm?6 
Responses to all three questions, however different they may be from 
each other, must rely on certain understandings, fundamentally descriptive 
but often normative, of the ways in which states and other actors 
interacting with international law (e.g., diplomats, judicial decisionmakers 
in international tribunals, and military commanders) are expected to 
behave. Over the last decade, many compelling analyses of similar 
questions in international law have built on particular assumptions of what 
may be termed “perfect” rationality: the growing area of economic analysis 
of international law.7 In many other areas of law, however, the value of 
applying rational choice theory to legal questions has been questioned and 
contested by empirically grounded streams of behavioral economics and 
cognitive psychology that focus on systematic divergences from perfect 
rationality.8 Should these behavioral insights not now be avidly applied to 
international law? 
                                                        
5 See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Dissent as Dialectic: Horizontal and Vertical Disagreement in WTO 
Dispute Settlement, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2012) (arguing that “[t]oo much dissent can 
undermine the legitimacy of a court”). 
6 See Aaron Fellmeth, The Proportionality Principle in Operation: Methodological Limitations of 
Empirical Research and the Need for Transparency, 45 ISR. L. REV. 125, 133-35 (2012) (offering the 
International Committee of the Red Cross study as an example of the divergence between “‘law 
on the books’ and ‘law in action’” and illustrating the impact that the proportionality principle has 
had on state attitudes). 
7 Any bibliographical list would risk injury by omission. For a literature survey likening states 
to individual rational actors, and hence treaties to contracts, see Alan O. Sykes, International Law, 
in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 757, 771 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 
2007). Important examples can be found in Symposium, Rational Choice and International Law, 31 
J. LEGAL STUD. S1 (2002), and in Symposium, Public International Law and Economics, 2008 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1. Central treatises on the topic are JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE 
LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW 
WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008); ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, 
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013); and JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008). 
8 See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000) 
(“[I]ndividuals frequently act in ways that are incompatible with the assumptions of rational 
choice theory.”). 
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Employed properly, a behavioral approach can contribute to 
international legal research by raising interesting hypotheses relating to 
problems in international law, and by providing frameworks for 
experimental and empirical testing of these hypotheses, with both 
explanatory and normative implications. A behavioral approach could be 
seen as either augmenting or in some cases supplanting the now common 
(one is almost tempted to say “traditional”) economic analyses of 
international law. Indeed, in some cases, behavioral research can be useful 
without any recourse to the framework of economic analysis. In any event, 
behavioral analysis must be added to the international legal research 
toolbox of alternative research methodologies, each of which should be 
employed where it is illuminating and can be pursued with intellectual 
honesty. 
In making the case for behavioral analysis of international law, the 
Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I discuss some weaknesses of rational 
choice and economic analysis of international law, primarily the limits of 
assumptions of perfect rationality that are not backed by empirical 
substantiation. In Part II, I briefly explain the corrective impact of 
cognitive psychology on the economic analysis of law in general: its 
understanding that human rationality is bounded, characterized by 
systematic failures, shortcuts, and susceptibility to seemingly irrational 
traits such as fairness, but also its descriptive and empirical strengths. This 
is not to say that behavioral analysis is contrary to standard rational choice 
but rather a complement and supplement. Part II also suggests what value 
cognitive psychology might contribute to international legal research, 
highlighting how few studies currently exist in this direction. In Part III, I 
discuss and provide responses to what appear to be the central 
methodological objections to the behavioral approach to international law: 
(i) the focus of behavioral analysis on the individual, (ii) the empirical 
foundations of behavioral economics, and (iii) its relative lack of parsimony. 
Part IV offers indicative behavioral research frameworks for three issues in 
international law: (i) the development of international treaty law, (ii) the 
collegiality and dissent in international tribunals, and (iii) the target 
selection in armed conflict. Finally, I recapitulate and offer some 
concluding remarks on the potential role and viability of a behavioral 
approach to international law. 
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I. REVISITING THE LIMITS OF RATIONAL CHOICE 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Are states and other international legal actors “rational” when they 
interact with each other in the processes of making international law, 
abiding by it, violating it, and enforcing it? A burgeoning, essential, and 
predominantly American9 literature that uses rational choice tools in the 
analysis of international law assumes that they are.10 The “law and 
economics” (L&E) of international law has in the last decade made 
significant inroads into the study of international law. It principally rests 
upon assumptions of perfect rationality, whether of states or of 
decisionmakers, that are determinative of state conduct in international law. 
To be sure, social scientists engaged in the study of international 
relations (IR) have used the same assumptions of rationality and employed 
similar methods for more than half a century.11 For most of this time, 
mainstream international legal scholarship has occupied the separate 
methodological universes of doctrinaire positivism—“natural” law 
                                                        
9 The 2006 symposium on Public International Law and Economics held by the Max Planck 
Institute for Research on Collective Goods in Bonn is illuminating in this respect: all paper-
presenters were from U.S. law schools, while the largely skeptical commentators were German; 
the symposium contributions were subsequently published in a U.S. law journal. See Georg Nolte, 
Public International Law and Economics: Concluding Remarks to the Bonn Conference, 2008 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 429. Indeed, the gap between American and European acceptance of economic analysis of 
law was a subject of debate at the symposium. See id. at 429 (“[E]conomic analysis of law plays a 
less prominent role in Europe than in the United States.”). 
10 Assumptions as theoretical tools should not, however, be mistaken for claims about reality. 
The old saw about economists stuck in a hole in the ground and assuming a ladder in order to 
extract themselves amply demonstrates the difference. Nevertheless, both proponents and 
opponents of rational choice too often blur this distinction. For a further analysis on the issue, see 
infra text accompanying notes 33-34. 
11 The “realist” school that launched the disciplinary study of IR in the late 1940s in a 
Hobbesian tradition employed rudimentary concepts of rational choice by emphasizing the role of 
national interest in the determination of state behavior and state sensitivity to incentives 
presented by power relations. See HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 3-17 (6th ed. 1985) (discussing the developments of the 
realist school of international politics). Neoliberal IR theory built on the rationality of states and 
added layers of strategic thinking to state behavior through the use of game theory. See, e.g., 
Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics (attributing the increasing popularity of 
game theory to its application to international law), in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 25, 25 
(Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986); see also James D. Morrow, Modeling the Forms of International 
Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information, 48 INT’L ORG. 387, 388-89 (1994) (demonstrating how 
game theory can help resolve the problems of sanctioning, monitoring, distribution, and 
information commonly faced in international relations); Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus 
Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
923, 923-24 (1985) (classifying the challenges faced by international relations as collective-action 
problems that can be explained through the application of game theory). 
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idealization or intuitive “policy-oriented” prescriptiveness.12 For a variety 
of reasons,13 international legal scholars turned their attention to the 
implications of IR theory for international law only after the end of the 
Cold War,14 to the point that today rational choice and economic analyses of 
international law are very much in vogue.15 Contemporary international 
lawyers who have not yet mastered the differences between the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma and Chicken16 or who lack a basic grasp of economic terminology 
(utility functions, externalities, Pareto efficiency, transaction costs, Coasean 
bargaining) jargon that was once, at most, the domain only of those who 
dealt with international economic law,17 increasingly risk missing out on a 
substantial body of cutting edge international law scholarship.18 
                                                        
12 For a non-critical but comprehensive survey of traditional doctrines of international law, 
see MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-20 (5th ed. 2005). 
13 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 
YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1999) (attributing international lawyers’ avoidance of L&E to its 
“seemingly inaccessible methodologies,” “supposedly conservative political prejudices,” and 
“presumed denigration of international law”). 
14 See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International 
Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335, 336 (1989) (“[O]verall, the discipline [of international law] has 
fallen behind other fields of law in developing an analytical approach informed by social 
science.”); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A 
Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 205 (1993) (comparing the view of international law as a 
futile discipline in the 1960s to its recent effectiveness); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International 
Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 367, 367-68 (1998) (acknowledging the recent proliferation of international relations 
research). For current evaluations of the international relations/international law interface, see 
Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, International Law and International Relations: Introducing an 
Interdisciplinary Dialogue, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 3, 3-27 ( Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. 
Pollack eds., 2013); and Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, David G. Victor & Yonatan Lupu, Political 
Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 47, 51 (2012). 
15 See, e.g., supra note 7. 
16 These are two of many variants of collective-action problems analyzed through game 
theory. For a succinct explanation, see TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 20-30 
(2004). For a fascinating critique of the ubiquity of the Prisoners’ Dilemma attributing the 
dominance of Prisoners’ Dilemma in political science research to path dependency, see Carol 
Rose, Game Stories, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 369, 383 (2010).  
17 It is hardly coincidental that many of the most path-breaking, prominent, and proficient 
L&E scholars of international law, such as Ken Abbott, Andrew Guzman, Alan Sykes, Joel 
Trachtman, and Michael Trebilcock, are also among the leading lights in international economic 
law.  
18 But see the fundamental critique of the influence of IR on international legal scholarship in 
the United States in MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE 
AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960 3 (2001), which critiques the “conviction that 
international reform could be derived from deep insights about society, history, human nature or 
developmental laws of an international and institutional modernity,” and asserts that it has “failed 
to produce or even support viable policies.” For a spirited response, see Mark A. Pollack, Is 
International Relations Corrosive of International Law? A Reply to Martti Koskenniemi, 27 TEMP. 
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 The advent of economic analysis of international law is, in essence, the 
fusion of two complementary trends. First, on the demand side, the 
acknowledgement of the relative dearth of non-doctrinaire research 
methodology and disciplinary rigor in international legal studies19 has led 
some legal scholars to turn not only to IR theory, but more directly to 
classical economic theory.20 Second, but of no lesser importance, on the 
supply side, economic analysis of law has (in the United States and 
elsewhere) significantly impacted virtually all fields of law and 
jurisprudence, both in theory and in practice.21 For the disciples of L&E, 
the application of its idiom to international law is simply another feather in 
their collective caps.22 
Rational choice analysis of international law thus satisfies both 
international law’s quest for methodological decorum and the L&E school’s 
ambitious mission of increased legal and social influence. Nonetheless, this 
marriage—the rationalization of international law—has not been 
harmonious, leading at times to disconcerting results. For many 
international lawyers, economic analysis of international law, for all its 
merits, will be forever tainted (and as a result, too easily ignored) because 
of its association with the crude revisiting and rehearsal of the “realist” 
claim that international law is not a system of law at all.23 This is 
                                                                                                                           
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 339, 340 (2013), where the author concludes that “Koskenniemi’s critique of 
IR represents at best an anachronism, describing the early Cold War IR of our grandfathers 
rather than the contemporary field, and at worst a distortion of IR scholars’ attitudes, aims, and 
influence on the legal profession.” 
19 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law 97 (Univ. 
of Chi., John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 63, 1999), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=145972 (“Modern [customary international 
law] scholarship occupies the position that domestic legal scholarship held a century ago. Heavy 
reliance on cases and treatises gives scholars a distorted picture of actual state practices . . . .”); see 
also Anne-Marie Slaughter & Steven R. Ratner, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A 
Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 299 (1999) (noting that IR theory and L&E theory 
claim to add rigor to international studies). 
20 See Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 13, at 50 (“[A]lmost every international law research 
subject could be illuminated, to some degree, by [economic analysis] research methods.”).  
21 See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Dean, Yale Law Sch., Remarks at the Second Driker Forum 
for Excellence in the Law (Sept. 29, 1994) (presenting L&E as “the single most influential 
jurisprudential school in this country”), in 42 WAYNE L. REV. 115, 160 (1995). 
22 For example, Richard Posner, arguably the dean of the L&E school, devoted very little 
attention to international legal issues in RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
136-41 (6th ed. 2003), implying that international legal issues should be analyzed as any other 
legal subject, by equating treaty law with domestic contract law with respect to the concept of 
efficient breach. 
23 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1176-77 (1999) (suggesting a conservative rational choice formulation of 
customary international law). But see PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN 
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unfortunate. The field has produced many contributions and responses,24 
more rigorously based on economic theory and method. Many of these 
contributions both effectively uphold the normative value of international 
law and go a long way toward explaining its functions, or at least toward 
presenting hypotheses to this end. There should be no doubt that rational 
choice and L&E analyses have presented—and can continue to present—
many of the most enriching and challenging contributions to the ways we 
reflect upon international law. Even if its introduction has produced 
antagonism, the rational choice approach has much to offer, both positively 
and normatively. 
However, the gaps in the existing literature—such as the substantial 
and substantive differences between studies ostensibly based upon the same 
methodology—only highlight the susceptibility of economic analysis of law 
to the political manipulation of assumptions and definitions. This risks 
robbing it of its main self-professed strength: its scientific basis and 
methodological parsimony. Moreover, even the most developed economic 
analyses of international law are ultimately little more than shadows of 
similar analyses generated by the neoliberal–institutionalist school of 
international relations,25 an important earlier generation of knowledge, still 
taught but now rarely practiced on its own.26 At times, such analyses have a 
tendency to frame what should rightly be hypotheses about state behavior 
                                                                                                                           
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (7th ed. 1997) (referring to the booming 
professional and academic work supporting international law and declaring “[t]he old discussion 
on whether international law is true ‘law’ is therefore a moot point”). See generally Anne van 
Aaken, To Do Away with International Law? Some Limits to ‘The Limits of International Law,’ 17 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 289 (2006) (discussing L&E theory as developed by Posner and Goldsmith). 
24 See generally GUZMAN, supra note 7 (describing rational choice and the general theory of 
international law as they pertain to customary international law); TRACHTMAN, supra note 7 
(describing customary international law).  
25 See GUZMAN, supra note 7, at 33-34 (reducing the workings of international law to the 
“three Rs” of reciprocity, retaliation, and reputation, which are remarkably reminiscent of the 
repertoire of IR theory of earlier periods). See generally Kal Raustiala, Refining the Limits of 
International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423 (2006) (discussing the effects of economic 
theory as it applies to international law); see also TRACHTMAN, supra note 7, at 131-33 (describing 
the use of game theory in generating international treaties). 
26 Where in the recent past international relations studies could at least seem to be neatly 
divided into paradigmatic “-isms”—realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism—it is increasingly 
acknowledged that these schools share some common ground and, more importantly, that each 
approach has its explanatory strengths and weaknesses, jointly constituting the international 
relations “toolbox,” suggesting a dialectic rather than linear or paradigmatic pattern of progress. 
See Mark Blyth, Structures Do Not Come with an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas, and Progress in 
Political Science, 1 PERSP. ON POL. 695, 701-02 (2003) (arguing that “stark opposition and all-or-
nothing alternatives need not be the choice facing the discipline [of political science]”); see also 
Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 14, at 37 (discussing the ongoing debate between realists and 
constructivists). 
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as question-begging assumptions instead. Interestingly, IR researchers are 
cutting loose from the analytical strictures of perfect rational choice,27 while 
at the very same time international legal scholars are beginning to discover 
it. Legal research would do well to avoid rearguing intellectual debates now 
all but settled in the IR discipline. Additionally, although it has generated 
interesting hypotheses, L&E’s venture into international law has not been 
backed up by a requisite level of empirical substantiation. Hypotheses are 
advanced but rarely tested beyond the provision of anecdotal evidence 
typical of informal L&E. In this respect, economic analysis of international 
law can—and should—be salvaged by developing a more rigorous empirical 
dimension. The generation of hypotheses is an important step in research, 
but as Milton Friedman wrote, “the only relevant test of the validity of a 
hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience.”28 
The most imperative of L&E’s assumptions is the assumption of 
rationality of states and other actors under international law, which leads us 
back to the question asked in opening: are states and other international 
actors “rational?” We can make this question more precise and indeed more 
interesting; instead of querying whether states are rational or not—there 
seems to be no self-evident or other reason to presume that states are 
inherently irrational29—the question ought to be: what is the nature of their 
rationality? Studies employing rational choice in the analysis of 
international legal problems and systems typically adhere to conventional 
assumptions about human rationality and apply them en banc to states.30 
Only rarely are these assumptions somehow qualified, for example 
through the employment of “thin” rationality.31 Thin rationality is a 
framework in which states would be deemed rational in their behavior, 
                                                        
27 See, e.g., Jonathan Mercer, Rationality and Psychology in International Politics, 59 INT’L ORG. 
77, 79-80 (2005) (arguing that psychology complements rational choice because actors can exhibit 
irrational behaviors); Matthew Rabin, A Perspective on Psychology and Economics, 46 EUR. ECON. 
REV. 657, 660-62 (2002) (arguing that rational choice is unrealistic and should be complemented 
by psychology).  
28 MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 8-9 (1966).  
29 See Anne van Aaken, Towards Behavioral International Law and Economics: A Comment on 
Enriching Rational Choice Institutionalism for the Study of International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 47, 
58 (asserting that “[f]ew international lawyers would deny that states . . . act in predominantly 
rational ways”). 
30 See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 579, 
586 (2005) (assuming that “states are rational beings; that they act in their own self-interest, at 
least as that interest is defined by the political leaders of the state; and that states are aware of the 
impact of their actions on the behavior of other states”).  
31 On “thin” rationality, see generally DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES 
OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 17-19 
(1994). 
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pursuing self-interest within a certain set of preferences, but it is 
acknowledged that they set these preferences not by “objective” standards 
of utility or efficiency, but rather idiosyncratically, in accordance with their 
own emotional, cultural and historical charges “that many outsiders might 
find difficult to understand.”32 Such a contextualization of state behavior 
would appear obvious to traditional, regionalist, or otherwise specialist 
scholars and analysts of international politics but it is an important 
modifier to conservative economic analysis. Moreover, in the broader 
context of international legal research, it stumbles upon the can of worms 
of cultural relativism and erodes the paradigm of perfect rationality, making 
it highly contingent on specific assumptions about individual state or 
societal preferences and utility functions. 
There is nothing inherently wrong with this; in IR, many explanations 
“are no longer parsimonious.”33 Nevertheless, some rational choice analyses 
of international law might also generally concede the possibility of 
miscalculation by rational actors, though this is also not inconsistent with 
traditional expected utility theory, as only decisions that are haphazard, 
arbitrary, random, or otherwise a priori inutile are removed from the 
model. The latter cases are symptoms of irrationality, not of qualified 
rationality—divergences from perfect rationality are mistakes, not 
behavioral patterns. 
What, then, is wrong with the perfect rationality model of international 
law and politics? Most clearly, it is empirically false; more accurately, it is 
empirically unsubstantiated. So far, international L&E’s chief weakness lies 
in its seeming reluctance to seriously test its hypotheses. In some cases, 
these hypotheses might be factually valid, and hence, useful; however, they 
usually remain hypotheses. As anywhere, with respect to international law, 
L&E clearly needs to become more empirical and less theoretical, in which 
case it could be brought into the fold of the so-called new legal realism (not 
unlike the behavioral form of analysis discussed in this Article).34 However, 
                                                        
32 Russel Korobkin & Jonathan Zasloff, Roadblocks to the Road Map: A Negotiation Theory 
Perspective on the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict After Yasser Arafat, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 10 (2005). 
33 Deborah Kay Elms, New Directions for IPE: Drawing from Behavioral Economics, 10 INT’L 
STUD. REV. 239, 242 (2008). Parsimony is further discussed in Section III.C, infra. 
34 See Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 296 (2001) 
(book review) (arguing that behavioral law and economic theory is as limited as pure rationality 
theory); Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World 
Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 71-90 (2009) (discussing the various 
forms of new legal realism); Gregory Shaffer, A New Legal Realism: Method in International 
Economic Law Scholarship (emphasizing the importance of field work in legal realism), in 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE 29, 39 
(Colin B. Picker, Isabella D. Bunn & Douglas W. Arner eds., 2008).  
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a standard defense against this claim is that rationality is not intended to 
depict reality. It is a model—no more, no less.35 Nevertheless, international 
L&E scholars rarely test their theories, yet often make significant claims 
about reality. Furthermore, some economic analysis, even if it is formally 
hypothetical and descriptive, includes a disguised or otherwise embedded 
normative element. Implicit in the assumptions of individual (or state) 
rationality is the view that individuals or states are and should be (perfectly) 
rational, and this is no longer a model, but a positive or normative claim. 
Beyond international L&E, however, studies of rationality have 
evolved into the gradual establishment of a behavioral school of economics 
that challenges basic assumptions of human rational choice, judgment, and 
decisionmaking with alternative, empirically based observations on 
cognitive psychology. Recently, these have been greatly popularized36 and, 
for better or for worse, cannot be ignored in current public policy debates. 
Would it not be possible and potentially productive to turn to these insights 
“to bring new and more accurate understandings of behavior and choice to 
bear”37 on international law, subject to standard methodological 
qualifications and controls? Cognitive psychology has led to analyses of 
domestic legal systems and arrangements; it has also led to non-legal 
behavioral studies in IR, indeed with a long, if not dominant, scholarly 
tradition (especially in security studies).38 These efforts are certainly not 
without their failures and flaws, but conceptually, they hold great potential, 
and it would be analytically and discursively productive to now explicitly 
merge them into the idea of behavioral international law, as explained in 
the following Part.39 
                                                        
35 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1 (2004) (“The 
advantage of studying models is that they allow descriptive and normative questions to be 
answered in an unambiguous way . . . .”). The emphasis is, therefore, on parsimony, rather than 
empirical accuracy. 
36 See generally, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT 
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2009); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
37 Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 1 (Cass R. 
Sunstein ed., 2000).  
38 See, e.g., ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS 117-201 (1976) (discussing the effects of rational and irrational actions in psychological 
theories as they pertain to international decisionmaking); YAACOV Y. I. VERTZBERGER, RISK 
TAKING AND DECISIONMAKING: FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION DECISIONS 43-112 (1998) 
(using socioeconomic factors to discuss how people evaluate risks). See generally Jack S. Levy, 
Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems, 13 POL. 
PSYCHOL. 283 (1992) (discussing the evaluation of international relations under prospect theory). 
39 Indeed, the idea of behavioral international law research flows naturally from the 
problematique of nonempirical, rational choice approaches to international law. See generally van 
Aaken, supra note 29 (offering several new methods of utilizing social science in international legal 
analysis).  
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Before moving into a more detailed explanation of the implications of 
behavioral economics for international law, it is important to at least briefly 
note other well-developed critiques and sophisticated alternatives to the 
standard rational choice approach. Given the limitations of rational choice 
methods in international law, some have pursued paths of social 
constructivism and sociology of law by explaining state behavior in 
sociological terms.40 Moreover, one can seek out the ways in which the 
rationality of individuals, as well as collectives, is socially constructed by 
economic theory through an examination of studies in the field of economic 
sociology.41 The interaction between such sociological approaches and the 
use of insights from behavioral economics and cognitive psychology is 
complex and multileveled. For example, in their important work on 
acculturation and socialization in international law, Ryan Goodman and 
Derek Jinks refer not only to social pressures to conform, but also to 
cognitive pressures.42 They deal with cognitive features as part of the 
environment in which organizations, such as states, act.43 And of course, 
                                                        
40 See, e.g., Sungjoon Cho, Beyond Rationality: A Sociological Construction of the World Trade 
Organization, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 321, 334-53 (2012) (proposing a sociological framework to 
understand and improve operations of the World Trade Organization since rationalism overlooks 
vital social dimensions of the organization and leaves theoretical gaps); Moshe Hirsch, The 
Sociology of International Economic Law: Sociological Analysis of the Regulation of Regional Agreements 
in the World Trading System, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 277, 288 (2008) (describing how the social 
constructivist approach posits that states’ interests and identities are constructed by social 
structures and acknowledges that states are embedded in a set of social relations where their 
identity is defined by their interaction with other international actors); see also Moshe Hirsch, The 
Sociology of International Law: Invitation to Study International Rules in Their Social Context, 55 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 891, 892 (2005) (discussing how recently international law scholars have used 
sociology to study international legal concepts, which has redefined international law and our 
understanding of its social limits). 
41 See Michel Callon, An Essay on Framing and Overflowing: Economic Externalities Revisited by 
Sociology (describing the impact that sociological accounts of externalities may have in 
negotiations, helping us understand the dynamics of markets and their reforms), in THE LAWS 
OF THE MARKETS 244, 264-66 (Michel Callon ed., 1998); Neil Fligstein, The Political and 
Economic Sociology of International Economic Agreements (discussing how economic sociology offers 
insights into understanding the structure of global markets), in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC 
SOCIOLOGY 183, 201 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 2d ed. 2005). I am grateful to 
Andrew Lang for pointing out this direction of inquiry, which has potentially interesting 
interactions with behavioral economics. 
42 See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International 
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 684 (2004) (“[C]ognitive pressures suggest that states may 
be more inclined to conform their behavior to community expectations—and that they are 
unlikely to sustain, over the long term, an idiosyncratic interpretation of any norm that the 
international community considers central.”); infra Section IV.B (returning to cognitive pressures 
to conform in the context of international judging). 
43 See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 1749, 1755-56 (2003) (studying how the cognitive environment guides state actors by 
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behavioral research and sociological scholarship share a heightened 
appreciation and requirement for empirical grounding. In short, there is 
still much to explore about the intellectual and methodological pathways 
that run between sociological approaches and psychological research 
methods in international law.44 My focus here is on the development of the 
latter. 
II. WHY BEHAVIORAL INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
Despite the apparent primacy of classical or traditional rational choice 
theory in international legal scholarship, contemporary formulations of 
rationality are far from monolithic. Traditional L&E employs classical 
theoretical economic assumptions of perfect human rationality. It assumes 
that under conditions of resource scarcity, human beings act as utility-
maximizing, self-interested beings that respond to incentives in accordance 
with stable preference priorities.45 These assumptions enable L&E scholars 
to discuss and analyze the ramifications of such rational behavior for the 
design and effectiveness of law and legal institutions, both market- and 
nonmarket-oriented. But where traditional L&E adheres to objective 
conceptions of ideal rationality personified in a hypothetical “homo 
economicus,”46 and international L&E imagines a “civitas economica,” 
behavioral L&E seeks to incorporate insights from empirical research in 
the field of cognitive psychology regarding human rationality as it is 
observed in reality and practice. Experimental research has shown that in 
many cases human behavior diverges from theoretical assumptions about 
rationality; consequently, “[t]he task of behavioral law and economics, 
simply stated, is to explore the implications of actual (not hypothesized) 
                                                                                                                           
structuring the field of possible action and the ways states inherit and satisfy specific 
expectations). 
44 Indeed, it is not surprising that some of the very first research on international law 
employing behavioral insights was brought forward by sociological scholars. See Paul Slovic, 
David Zionts, Andrew K. Woods, Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Psychic Numbing and Mass 
Atrocity (discussing possible ways to overcome “psychic numbing,” or turning off emotions in the 
face of mass atrocities, to mobilize global public sentiment and changes in international law), in 
THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 126, 136 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013).  
45 See Guzman, supra note 30, at 586 (assuming that states are rational beings acting in their 
own self-interest); see also GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR 14 (1976) (“[A]ll human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who 
maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an optimal amount of 
information and other inputs in a variety of markets.”). 
46 For the development of the term, see Joseph Persky, Retrospectives: The Ethology of Homo 
Economicus, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 221, 230 (1995), which explains that the “economic man” is useful 
not to indicate that humans are rational, but that social science works best when its findings are 
limited by imposing some basic assumptions. 
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human behavior for the law.”47 After a few decades of significant 
experimental research by cognitive psychologists on human 
decisionmaking, it is well-acknowledged that, in many ways, human 
individuals are decidedly not rational in the ideal sense. Human action is 
not only “shaped by relevant economic constraints but is highly affected by 
people’s endogenous preferences, knowledge, skills, endowments, and a 
variety of psychological and physical constraints.”48 
A behavioral–economic approach to law supplants the basic 
assumptions of rationality with several qualified statements on human 
decisionmaking, based on experimental observations of human behavior.49 
Like classic economic rationality, behavioral economics is first and foremost 
a theory of judgment. The former emphasizes models based upon objective 
methods of utility maximization. The latter, similarly, embraces the 
importance of autonomous decisionmaking, but strives to understand how 
it plays out in reality. Behavioral economics varies by taking into account 
the real boundaries and attributes of human character and capacities. 
Indeed, for the reasons noted above, perfect rationality is a theory of 
judgment that also includes elements of a normative theory. In contrast, 
behavioral theory has a very strong empirical, descriptive element. This is 
not to say that it cannot provide the basis for normative analysis. Of course 
it can; understanding how actors—states or individuals—behave in practice 
is a crucial element in designing rules with the instrumental intention of 
influencing this behavior.50 Indeed, advocates of the behavioral approach to 
                                                        
47 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 37, at 13, 14. 
48 Francesco Parisi & Vernon Smith, Introduction to THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 1, 1-2 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005). 
49 This does not mean, however, that the rational choice framework of analysis is entirely 
rejected. As Thomas S. Ulen and Russell B. Korobkin stated:  
[W]e do not argue that the edifice of rational choice theory, which underlies so much of 
legal scholarship, be ripped down. Rather, we suggest that it be revised, paying heed to 
important flaws in its structure that unduly and unnecessarily limit the development of a 
more nuanced understanding of how law affects society. 
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1144. 
In other words, other central tenets of economic analysis of law—especially the idea that 
actors respond to incentives that the law creates or influences—are retained. For a purist response, 
implying that the rational choice framework and the assumption of rationality are a package deal, 
see Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 
1567 (1998). Posner explains that even when faced with anomalous behavior, the rational choice 
economist will look for a theoretical modification that might accommodate an apparent anomaly 
to the assumption of rationality. Id. 
50 See Russell Korobkin, The Problems with Heuristics for Law (“A large body of evidence, now 
familiar to the legal community, demonstrates that individual judgment and choice is often driven 
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law consider it to be both normatively neutral, because it is not necessarily 
wedded to welfare economic analysis, and normatively relevant, because of 
its ability to point to systematic decision errors that reduce the capacity of 
the law to promote social welfare.51 
Simplified, the central concept underlying the study of behavioral 
theory is the idea of bounded rationality, which recognizes that human 
cognitive capabilities are not perfect or infinite.52 The human brain makes 
shortcuts in judgment and decisionmaking that diverge from expected 
utility theory. Limiting aspects of bounded rationality and the shortcuts 
taken to overcome them—generally known as biases and heuristics, 
respectively—inevitably cause human decisions that appear erroneous when 
compared with perfectly rational outcomes. Having said this, it is 
important to understand that behavioral economics does not aspire to 
replace one ideal-type decisionmaker (a perfectly rational one) with another 
(rationally imperfect) decisionmaker. Rather, the behavioral research 
agenda aims to explore the characteristics of the real decisionmaking 
processes of different types of actors under different circumstances. So far, 
various important generalizable characteristics have been identified, but 
behavioralists do not claim that they exist equally among all decisionmakers 
in all cases and under all conditions. 
Momentarily setting this caveat of contingency aside, perhaps the 
single most important insight of behavioral psychology discovered through 
economic analysis derives from prospect theory.53 Prospect theory questions 
                                                                                                                           
by heuristic-based reasoning as opposed to the pure optimization approach presumed by rational 
choice theory.”), in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 45, 45 (G. Gigerenzer & C. Engel eds., 2006). 
51 See Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L. REV. 237, 
314-25 (2008) (describing how “the behavioral analysis of law is simultaneously normatively 
neutral and normatively relevant[,] . . . normatively neutral because it is not committed to any 
specific legal goal or value” and normatively relevant because it provides a tool to look at the 
impact of systematic decision errors on social welfare). 
52 Though not in name, the concept of bounded rationality was first introduced into academic 
discourse by Herbert Simon in A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. See Herbert A. Simon, A 
Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 114 (1955) (suggesting the replacement of 
“economic man” with “a choosing organism of limited knowledge and ability” whose 
“simplifications of the real world for purposes of choice introduce discrepancies between the 
simplified model and the reality”). For a collection of studies on the topic, see generally 
BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (G. Gigerenzer & R. Selten eds., 2001). 
While the notion of boundedness implies a limitation of rationality, some of the literature views it 
as enabling effective decisionmaking. See MARK KELMAN, THE HEURISTICS DEBATE 87 (2011) 
(noting that economists who speak of “bounded rationality” may “fail to account adequately for 
the fact that the best way of solving many problems . . . is to use a scaled-back computational 
method”).  
53 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 
47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274 (1979) (presenting an alternative account of individual 
decisionmaking under risk for simple prospects with monetary outcomes and stated probabilities 
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the validity of the Coase theorem, which both expresses and relies upon the 
idea of perfect rationality. In Coasean economics, in the absence of 
transaction costs, the initial assignment of resources or entitlements is not 
determinative of their ultimate allocation. Cost–benefit bargaining between 
rational actors will assign the entitlements efficiently to the actor who 
values them the most, regardless of the starting point.54 The Coase theorem 
is elemental for classical economic analysis of the law because it neutralizes 
the psychological aspects of human interactions. Indeed, it is the basis of 
L&E’s overarching parsimony. However, experimental observations have 
shown repeatedly, in varying circumstances, that initial assignments of 
entitlements do matter. Initial assignments significantly influence actors’ 
decisions, in particular, their willingness to part with their entitlements. In 
Coasean terms, $10 (or any other item of value—in international affairs this 
could be territory, resources, or any other asset of political or symbolic 
importance) has equal worth, whether gained or lost, whether compared to 
rags or to riches. Yet in real life, people do not regard losses and gains of 
equal size indifferently. For example, they will often invest more in the 
prevention of loss than in the generation of gains of the same amount. This 
is the logic that underlies a variety of related terms that derive or are 
otherwise related to the ideas of prospect theory, such as loss aversion,55 the 
endowment effect,56 and framing effects.57 
                                                                                                                           
that “distinguishes two phases in the choice process: an early phase of editing and a subsequent 
phase of evaluation”). 
54 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-8 (1960) (illustrating how a 
farmer and a cattle raiser bargain differently over damage liability for a straying cattle that 
destroys crops based on the cost of crops and cattle and what is most efficient for each actor). 
55 For the most comprehensive and thought-provoking study of loss aversion in legal contexts, 
see Eyal Zamir, Loss Aversion and the Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 829, 830 (2012), where the author 
theorizes that “[g]ains and losses are defined relative to a baseline or reference point. The value 
function is normally steeper for losses than gains, indicating loss aversion.” See also EYAL ZAMIR, 
LAW, PSYCHOLOGY, AND MORALITY: THE ROLE OF LOSS AVERSION 1-2 (2015) (explaining 
that “people’s preferences and choices are a function not only of the expected value of different 
outcomes, but also of their risk aversion, which in turn depends on their overall assets” and that 
gains and losses are defined in relation to a reference point making the value function for losses 
convex, or people more likely to accept a smaller gain just to avoid a potential larger loss).  
56 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1325 (1990) (positing that the 
endowment effect, described as “measures of willingness to accept greatly exceed[ing] measures of 
willingness to pay,” persists in market settings); id. at 1326 (citing a hypothesis that many 
discrepancies between willingness to accept and willingness to pay “reflect a genuine effect of 
reference positions on preferences” and the endowment effect is this “increased value of a good to 
an individual when the good becomes part of the individual’s endowment”); see also Russell 
Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law (describing how the 
endowment effect is also related to the phenomenon known as “status quo bias”), in BEHAVIORAL 
LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 37, at 116. 
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Prospect theory and the various phenomena it informs present a 
fundamental diversion from perfect rationality. If law—including 
international law—has the aim of directing the behavior of actors—
including states and other actors engaged with international law—it must 
take prospect theory into account, at least in instances where it can 
empirically be shown to have a significant impact. 
There are additional psychological kinks in rationality, systematically 
substantiated by scientific experiments in cognitive psychology. For 
example, under the availability bias, “[p]eople tend to think that risks are 
more serious when an incident is readily called to mind.”58 Under the 
so-called hindsight bias, people tend to overestimate ex ante predictions 
they had made “concerning the likelihood of an event’s occurring after 
learning that it actually did occur.”59 Probability matching is a proven 
tendency of human subjects to make choices that match the relative 
frequency of events, instead of utility-maximizing choices that would 
presuppose the occurrence of the most probable (e.g., when faced with a 
six-sided die with four red sides and two white sides and asked to 
repeatedly guess the color that would be rolled, people choose red two-
thirds of the time, instead of the utility-maximizing solution that would 
choose red every time).60 
Like prospect theory, availability bias, hindsight bias, probability 
matching, and other biases and heuristics hold important lessons for the 
design of law and legal process in a variety of areas. For example, it has 
                                                                                                                           
57 Framing effects arise when alternative descriptions of the same decision problem give rise 
to different preferences. Thus, in one classic example, people who have lost $10 on the way to the 
theater will tend to nonetheless purchase a ticket; but people who have lost a pre-purchased ticket 
to the theater worth $10 will not, even though in expected utility terms, the rational decision 
should be the same. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 457 (1981) (providing the ticket example to illustrate how an 
existing account affects a decision); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the 
Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, S255-62 (1986) (providing additional examples of framing 
effects that control the representation of options and explain invariance). 
58 Sunstein, supra note 37, at 5.  
59 Thomas S. Ulen, Human Fallibility and the Forms of the Law: The Case of Traffic Safety, in 
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 48, at 397, 410; see also 
Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under 
Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 298 
(1975) (“Judges may estimate the likelihood of a reported outcome by initially assigning it 
100%, . . . then looking for reasons to adjust downward from there. Adjustment from initial values 
is typically inadequate and would produce creeping determinism . . . .”). 
60 See Richard F. West & Keith E. Stanovich, Is Probability Matching Smart? Associations 
Between Probabilistic Choices and Cognitive Ability, 31 MEMORY & COGNITION 243, 244 (2003) 
(providing the die example and its heuristic results as demonstrative of probability matching 
responses when the frequencies of hypothetical outcomes are inferable from the outset). 
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been argued that availability bias, compounded by social and political 
processes, makes risk regulators vulnerable to inefficient decisions;61 and 
hindsight bias operating in conjunction with other biases prevent increased 
driver tort liability from reducing traffic accidents.62 Others have argued 
that probability matching supports employing a risk-based rather than a 
harm-based liability scheme in tort law, inducing individuals to behave 
more like maximizers than probability matchers.63 Similar lessons surely 
exist for international law. 
These expressions of bounded rationality show that in many situations, 
individuals are incapable of rational utility-maximization because of the 
way the human mind processes information and reacts to particular 
circumstances. In many cases, heuristics can be effective in reducing costs 
of decisionmaking. But at the same time, they may also lead to systematic 
and repeated errors. In addition to bounded rationality, cognitive 
psychology has shown that individuals may have only bounded willpower.64 
This concept significantly undermines the premises of classical rational 
choice. People sometimes act against their own interests, even when fully 
informed and conscious of the damage they may be inflicting upon 
themselves. The classic example is habitual smokers who do not kick the 
habit, even if they declare that they would like to. While this may be 
attributable to substance addiction, behaviorists have shown that bounded 
willpower is influential in other areas that are relevant to law, such as lack 
of self-control in criminal behavior.65 
Finally, to complete the picture, in contrast to rational choice’s 
assumptions of self-interest, people sometimes deliberately act contrary to 
                                                        
61 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 683, 746 (1999) (“[A]vailability cascades constitute a major, perhaps the leading, source of 
the risk-related scares that have cramped federal regulatory policy at both the legislative and 
executives levels . . . . [C]ascades force governments to adopt expensive measures without careful 
consideration of the facts.”).  
62 See Ulen, supra note 59, at 414 (describing how “the presence of the hindsight bias suggests 
that tort law may not work as well as rational choice theory had hoped to create incentives to take 
care” because there may be nothing that manufacturers or drivers can do to avoid liability if an 
accident occurs and juries assume they are liable).  
63 See Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Matching Probabilities: The Behavioral Law and Economics of 
Repeated Behavior, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2005) (“[P]robability matching shows the 
advantages of using a risk-based liability system (imposing costs on the creation of risks) rather 
than the use of a harm-based liability system (imposing costs only for the creation of risks that 
materialize in harm).”). 
64 See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 47, at 15. 
65 See, e.g., James Q. Wilson & Allan Abrahamse, Does Crime Pay?, 9 JUST. Q. 359, 368-71 
(1992) (analyzing criminal earnings per day in prison and suggesting that criminals’ opportunism 
and focus on the present (i.e., discounting future costs of punishment) leads them to decisions 
that can render classical deterrence inefficient). 
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their own interests in the name of fairness, to benefit others. Evidently, in 
many cases, the human utility function includes values relating to the 
utility of others. This aspect of human behavior is sometimes referred to as 
“bounded self-interest.”66 The calculus of fairness in actual rationality also 
includes the expectation of fair treatment from others.67 Both of these 
aspects of fairness consideration can be demonstrated through consistent 
experimental results in “ultimatum games,” in which subjects regularly 
make offers and responses that diverge from the rational economic 
prediction.68 These results are preserved even when agents do not know 
each other and possible reputational effects or social contexts are controlled 
for, suggesting that fairness is not (only) a social phenomenon but one that 
is embedded in human rationality.69 
Behavioral theory should not necessarily be seen as contradictory to 
rational choice; in many ways it supplements and completes it.70 But these 
experimental findings have suggested significant qualifications to rational 
choice–based social analyses and hold important implications for the L&E 
description and prescription of law.71 This nutshell explanation of 
behavioral economics and its effects on rational analysis of law is neither 
novel nor exhaustive. It is furnished here mainly to inform the question 
whether behavioral analysis could make a difference to international legal 
scholarship. If we assume, for the sake of argument, that the rationality of 
states and other international actors, or at least of those individuals and 
groups who determine state behavior is also “bounded,” that biases and 
heuristics impact their choices and decisions, then the answer to this 
question is undoubtedly positive. In essence, any area of international law 
that can be explained or analyzed in terms of rational choice—humanitarian 
law, trade law, environmental law, arms control, migration law, or more general 
aspects of international law such as treaty-making or adjudication—could 
                                                        
66 See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 47, at 16. 
67 See Elms, supra note 33, at 255 (describing concerns of fairness to others in the behavior of 
individuals). 
68 For a detailed description, see Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 47, at 21-26.  
69 But see generally Barbara A. Mellers et al., Group Report: Effects of Emotions and Social 
Processes on Bounded Rationality, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY, supra note 52, at 263, and Joseph 
Henrich et al., Group Report: What Is the Role of Culture in Bounded Rationality?, in BOUNDED 
RATIONALITY, supra note 52, at 343, for a discussion of the role of society and culture in the 
development of behavioral biases and heuristics. 
70 Whether behavioral L&E challenges or rather complements traditional L&E is a question 
discussed in Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors, in THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 48.  
71 Conservative L&E remains unmoved by these findings because “the concept of rationality 
used by the economist is objective rather than subjective, so that it would not be a solecism to 
speak of a rational frog.” See POSNER, supra note 22, at 17. 
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benefit from the incorporation of behavioral economics, and some examples 
will be suggested later in this Article. Strikingly, however, despite the great 
potential that behavioral analysis holds for these areas of cardinal 
importance, one hardly finds recourse to behavioral science in international 
legal literature, L&E, or otherwise.72 The scarcity of behavioral research on 
international legal issues is evident even in the increasing literature on 
international risk regulation, which is a prime area for behavioral study.73 
Even leading scholars with a keen interest and high degree of 
proficiency in behavioral analysis of domestic law seem to refrain from 
applying behavioral insights when engaging in questions of international 
law. For example, in a lucid negotiation-theory analysis of the ongoing 
impasse in Israeli–Palestinian peace talks, Korobkin and Zasloff have 
employed a rational choice negotiation framework that allows for 
                                                        
72 First swallows have appeared, however. For discussions of applications to international 
humanitarian law, see Tomer Broude, Presentations at the Minerva Center for Human Rights 
Conference on Proportionality in Armed Conflict, Jerusalem: Behavioral Framing Effects and 
Proportionality in IHL (Nov. 2010), available at http://prezi.com/ayfsnphh5i3h/framing-ihl. See 
also Ashley Deeks, Cognitive Biases and Proportionality Decisions: A First Look (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/6_AshleyDeeks_p.pdf. For an analysis of the 
psychological causes for lack of affect toward genocide and mass atrocities, with operative 
recommendations in the areas of human rights and international institutions, see Slovic et al., 
supra note 44, at 136. For an application of the availability bias to bilateral investment treaty-
making, see generally Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen & Emma Aisbett, When the Claim Hits: 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning, 65 WORLD POL. 273 (2013); Lauge N. 
Skovgaard Poulsen, Bounded Rationality and the Diffusion of Modern Investment Treaties, 58 INT’L 
STUD. Q. 1 (2014); and Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Letting Down the Guard: Developing 
Countries, Investment Treaties, and Bounded Rationality (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). Two recent contributions take very different, but equally stimulating, behavioral–
empirical approaches to treaty formation. See generally Jean Galbraith, Treaty Options: Towards a 
Behavioral Understanding of Treaty Design, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 309 (2013) (employing database 
research to analyze the role of treaty reservations); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., Decision 
Maker Preferences for International Legal Cooperation, INT’L ORG. (forthcoming 2014) (using survey-
based research to analyze the influence of behavioral traits of key treaty negotiators on treaty 
formation). More general contributions include Anne van Aaken, Behavioral International Law and 
Economics, 55 HARV. INT’L L. J. 421 (2014); Anne van Aaken & Tomer Broude, Behavioral 
Economic Analysis of International Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Edward Elgar ed., forthcoming 2015); and ANNE VAN AAKEN & 
TOMER BROUDE, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2016).
 
73 But for notable exceptions, see David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the 
Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1315 (2003); Tracey Epps, Reconciling Public Opinion and 
WTO Rules under the SPS Agreement, 7 WORLD TRADE REV. 359 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond 
the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2003); Markus Wagner, Law Talk V. Science 
Talk: The Languages of Law and Science in WTO Proceedings, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 151 (2011); 
and Lesley Wexler, Limiting the Precautionary Principle: Weapons Regulation in the Face of Scientific 
Uncertainty, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 459 (2006). 
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miscalculation firmly within the “expected utility” tradition.74 They do not, 
however, discuss the potential insights of behavioral theory in the Israeli–
Palestinian context—even though Korobkin has separately addressed the 
role that heuristics and biases play in bargaining more generally, and how 
the acknowledgement of their existence can help negotiators either adjust 
their own decisions in order to reach normative results or take advantage of 
their counterparts in maximizing the terms negotiated.75 These behavioral 
insights, if applied to the Israeli–Palestinian context, are non-trivial. 
Consider, for example, the possible role of overconfidence and hindsight 
bias in both Israeli and Palestinian positions in general; or of the fairness 
bias in the meltdown of the Camp David talks in 2000, in particular, which 
could be analyzed as an ultimatum game; or the influence of endowment 
effects evident in Israel’s entrenched occupation and settlement policy on 
its negotiating positions; or the impact of the availability bias as triggered 
by recurring terrorist attacks on Israeli risk assessments that have informed 
its security policies in the occupied territories as well as its negotiating 
positions. These frameworks of analysis are not pursued in this Article—
they are only mentioned here to demonstrate the hesitation of behavioral 
legal analysts to apply their knowledge about human decisionmaking to 
international legal affairs. 
Why is there such reticence, to say the least, to apply behavioral theory 
to international law? The reasons themselves may be behavioral, but that is 
beside the point. The question is whether there are any methodological 
justifications for refraining from doing so. I now turn to discuss a number 
of particular obstacles or objections to the application of behavioral 
economics to international law, which have perhaps so far chilled the advent 
of this project. 
                                                        
74 See Korobkin & Zasloff, supra note 32, at 9 (assuming that Israel and Palestine engage in 
rational behavior when making decisions or taking actions). 
75 See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining 
Table, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 795 (2004). Another scholar who has applied behavioral economics to 
domestic legal issues, but standard traditional choice to international law, is Francesco Parisi. 
Compare Parisi & Smith, supra note 48, at 9 (recognizing the “mainstreaming of behavioral theory 
and the ongoing process of incorporation of psychological findings in the process of economic 
modeling), with Francesco Parisi & Catherine Ševčenko, Treaty Reservations and the Economics of 
Article 21(1) of the Vienna Convention, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 4-13 (2003) (applying game 
theory principles to understand states’ reservations to treaties). Treaty reservations are indeed a 
prime area for behavioral research, as demonstrated by Galbraith, supra note 72.  
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III. OBJECTIONS TO BEHAVIORAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
METHODOLOGICAL RESPONSES 
One can raise several theoretical and methodological objections to a 
behavioral approach to international law. First, cognitive psychology and 
behavioral economics relate primarily to the conduct of individuals as 
(obviously) unitary actors, while the main subjects of international law are 
collective entities, primarily states. Second, the main strength of the claims 
made by cognitive psychology regarding rationality and decisionmaking is 
its grounding in empirical observations derived from experiments made 
with human subjects, which are difficult and perhaps impossible to replicate 
meaningfully in the context of international law and international relations. 
Third, the parsimony of traditional rational choice analyses of international 
interactions is superior to that of bounded rationality, although the latter 
adds layered and contingent dynamics to otherwise more straightforward 
hypothetical mechanics. These are all legitimate objections. Notably, they 
could be voiced from practically all corners—by realists, traditional 
rationalists, behavioralists, and non-rationalists, albeit all for different 
reasons. However, there are good responses to each objection, as explained 
below, and the objections themselves are not sufficient to reject the project. 
Rather, they must be considered in the design of research methodologies 
that incorporate behavioral insights into the analysis of international law. I 
will deal with them in the order of their importance. 
A. The Individual Focus of Behavioral Theory 
Under this objection, a behavioral approach to international law would 
be faulted if it examined the conduct of states because it would ostensibly 
be making a leap of faith from the methodological individualism76 on which 
behavioral theory and research are premised, to methodological statism.77 
Put differently, states as constructed legal personalities do not necessarily 
                                                        
76 The term is used here loosely to refer to cognitive psychology’s focus on the individual, 
without any statement about the theoretical framing of the relationship between the individual 
and society in the social sciences. For a comprehensive survey and discussion of this grand debate, 
see generally LARS UDEHN, METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM: BACKGROUND, HISTORY 
AND MEANING (2001). 
77 See, for example, the objection to the application of prospect theory to decisionmaking of 
states, in Eldar Shafir, Prospect Theory and Political Analysis: A Psychological Perspective, 13 POL. 
PSYCHOL. 311, 313-14 (1992). Notwithstanding the objection, for such theoretical applications in 
specific international contexts, see, for example, Jack S. Levy, Loss Aversion, Framing, and 
Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conflict, 17 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 179, 
180 (1996), and Rose McDermott, Prospect Theory in International Relations: The Iranian Hostage 
Rescue Mission, 13 POL. PSYCHOL. 237, 245-52 (1992), both of which apply prospect theory to state 
leaders and small decisionmaking groups, rather than to states as unitary actors. 
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share the imperfections of individuals or, by some accounts, necessarily do 
not. There are at least three responses to this criticism, each with its own 
methodological consequences, corresponding to three levels of analysis: (1) 
the state as a unitary actor; (2) decisionmaking collectives in international 
law; and (3) the individual as a decisionmaker in international law. 
1. The State as a Unitary Actor? 
This is perhaps the most difficult of the objections, but ultimately, it 
does not hold. First, quite bluntly, to the extent that this objection was 
voiced from the traditional quarters of realists, L&E analysts, and 
international lawyers, the initial response should be to note the hypocrisy of 
the criticism. All of these traditional groups have tended to do exactly the 
same, equating states to individual agents and considering the state as a 
usually unitary actor and decisionmaker. Is there any reason, however, to 
suppose—or any substantiation to that effect—that states, even when seen 
as black boxes or billiard balls (i.e., without looking into their internal 
decisionmaking processes) are any more perfectly rational than individuals? 
If the general rules of human behavior are better captured by the concept of 
bounded rationality, the validity of an assumption that states conduct 
themselves within the dictates of perfect rationality would be an exception 
to that rule. Indeed, there are good reasons to think that states are less 
rational because decisions are made by both agents and collectives. The 
empirical burden of proving the validity of a decisionmaking theory may 
therefore rest not upon a loose behavioral approach, but rather upon 
traditional rationalist analyses whose assumptions are stricter. These would 
then have to explain how states overcome the bounded rationality of the 
individuals that compose them and perfect their own rationality. Generally, 
there are two ways to do this: by looking beyond the state and by looking 
within the state. 
Looking beyond the state, the argument against applying behavioral 
economic analysis to states would be that even if states naturally acted 
according to bounded rather than ideal rationality, the international 
political and legal environment in which states act would somehow have a 
corrective effect, leading them to become more perfectly rational. Put 
differently, the costs associated with behaving in imperfectly rational ways 
would lead states to adjust their behavior accordingly. Notably, a similar 
debate has arisen with respect to the rationality of another type of non-
individual, collective legal actor: the firm. Traditional economic analysts of 
law have claimed that selection effects in market contexts will discipline 
bounded rational behavior in firms, rendering empirical insights about 
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individual behavior immaterial.78 Indeed, some proponents of behavioral 
analysis have conceded this as a valid point.79 With respect to states, this is 
certainly an important issue, but it should be viewed as an impetus to 
perform behavioral research of international law, requiring empirical 
inquiries into the degree to which state behavior in discrete situations 
conforms to expected rational benchmarks, rather than as an obstacle. 
Indeed, in many—arguably, most—situations relating to international 
law, states operate in a noneconomic market environment, making the 
selection argument less relevant. Moreover, the application of selection 
effects to states is difficult, because in contrast to firms, states are never 
formally eliminated from international relations and do not incur losses in 
the same way that firms might be pushed out of the market—states can fail, 
but they do not liquidate.80 Finally, even with respect to firms active in 
economic market contexts, empirical behavioral research has shown that 
while competitive forces do tend to eliminate some boundedly rational 
firms, they also “inevitably select some other such actors for success,” to the 
point that firms that are imperfectly rational in their behavior even become 
overrepresented among surviving and successful corporations.81 
Subject to empirical research on this issue, it would appear that the 
same might apply as a plausible hypothesis relating to states (i.e., that 
states do not become more perfectly rational, but rather maintain a degree 
of boundedness despite the external competitiveness).82 But in any case, 
                                                        
78 Posner, supra note 49, at 1570-71.  
79 Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1747, 1758 (1998) (conceding that “everyone has problems with intertemporal choice”). But see 
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Approaches to Corporate Law (suggesting a number of strategies 
to overcome the problems of applying individual biases to a business setting), in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 442, 443-45 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. 
McDonnell eds., 2012). 
80 There are a few exceptions. For example, in 1934, the self-governing status of the British 
Dominion of Newfoundland was suspended due to economic crisis and its inability to pay interest 
charges on its national debt and replaced by a Commission of Government composed of non-
elected civil servants; in 1949, Newfoundland joined the Canadian Confederation. See David 
Mackenzie, Canada, The North Atlantic Triangle, and the Empire, in 4 THE OXFORD HISTORY OF 
THE BRITISH EMPIRE: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 574, 589-92 ( Judith M. Brown & Wm. 
Roger Louis eds., 1999). However, this likely was not caused by a particular form of rationality in 
the Dominion’s conduct. 
81 Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal Policy, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 485 (2002). 
82 One important stream of behavioral writing adopts an organizational approach, taking 
bounded rationality as a significant environmental factor in the firms’ decisionmaking. See, e.g., 
RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 99-101 
(1963) (arguing that firms are “adaptively rational” systems that learn from their past experience 
in an unstable and unpredictable environment, and thus the rationality of their decisions will be 
limited by the “problems of learning,” such as the inability to see the full range of choices and 
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this discussion does lead to an important methodological qualification. The 
idea of behavioral international law, so far as it is applied to states, is not 
simply to lift whatever knowledge we have gained about real individual 
decisionmaking and plant it willy-nilly on states, in the way that traditional 
L&E has often done with assumptions of human rationality. Rather, one 
goal of the approach would be to seek observable systematic diversions 
from rationality in state behavior, without simply assuming that those 
biases and heuristics found in individuals are replicated by states. Indeed, 
as already noted, behavioral psychology does not claim that all individuals 
suffer from the same cognitive biases or employ the same decisionmaking 
heuristics. It would be a travesty to behavioral theory to claim that states 
simply reproduce particular individual behavioral traits. Thus a behavioral 
approach to international law could focus on examining the decisions made 
by states in differing circumstances from a behavioral perspective, rather 
than simply applying individual behavioral theory to states. For example, 
one would not simply assume that states qua states have a fairness bias; this 
would have to be demonstrated empirically. Under this approach, one 
would maintain the state as the decisionmaking unit and look into the 
consistency of deviations from rationality apparent in the state’s decisional 
outputs. 
The second way of arguing that states might actually overcome both 
the bounded rationality of individuals (ostensibly undermining recourse to 
behavioral economic analysis of international law) and their naturally 
unitary character would be to cut the Gordian knot and look within the 
state. Perhaps processes taking place within the state perfect its rationality? 
To be sure, this line of argument would appear to be inherently inconsistent 
with the way economic analyses of international law have worked so far: 
with few exceptions, L&E analyses of international law have accepted the 
state as a unitary, even monolithic, actor.83 But contrary to the assumptions 
of realist theorists, states do not act like black boxes or billiard balls. Rather, 
                                                                                                                           
payoffs available). Elements of this approach have recently been transposed to international 
relations. See JOSEPH JUPILLE, WALTER MATTLI & DUNCAN SNIDAL, INSTITUTIONAL 
CHOICE AND GLOBAL COMMERCE 6-7, 22-23 (2013) (advancing the notion that the bounded 
rationality of states explains why preexisting institutions that are “good enough” persist despite 
the opportunity to change to “better” institutional arrangements). 
83 The most notable exceptions are Joel P. Trachtman, International Law and Domestic Political 
Coalitions: The Grand Theory of Compliance with International Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 127, 154-55 
(2010), which argues that a state’s decision to comply or not to comply with international law is a 
result of changes in domestic coalitions caused by the international law, and Joel P. Trachtman, 
Open Economy Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 14, at 544, 555, in which 
the author develops a model where domestic lobbying and voting based on preferences are the 
causal factors for determining states’ compliance with international law. 
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state behavior with respect to international law is the outcome of intricate 
social, political, administrative, and legislative processes that take place 
within the state. Yet, crucially, looking within the state does not negate the 
subsequent treatment of the state as an actor with individually observable 
behavioral traits. 
Liberalist international relations scholars have long recognized the 
complex interactions between domestic politics and international relations, 
through the metaphors of the second image84 or the two level game.85 For 
present purposes we are concerned with the question whether behavioral 
economic approaches can meaningfully be applied to states at the second, 
international level. Arguably, for bounded rationality (let alone bounded 
willpower or self-interest) to be manifest at the international game level—
in which we ought to include international law constructions and 
constraints—biases and heuristics must factor in also, and indeed initially, 
at the domestic game level. There is in fact a substantial body of research 
and scholarship on the role of bounded rationality in domestic political 
processes,86 as well as public policy and administration.87 To the extent that 
imperfect rationality within the state is a necessary condition for 
considering states as boundedly rational actors (unitary or non-unitary, 
depending on one’s definitions), it is quite easily satisfied. 
This does not, however, remove entirely this argument against applying 
bounded rationality to the state on the international plane because of intra-
state process. All that this scholarship might contribute in the present 
context is that cognitive biases and heuristics evident in the domestic policy 
environment may influence the preference formation of the state as an actor 
on the international level. In this sense, we are here merely confronted with 
a particular form of thin rationality of states.88 Domestic bounded 
rationality is neither necessary nor sufficient for international behavioral 
                                                        
84 See generally Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of 
Domestic Politics, 32 INT’L ORG. 881 (1978) (examining the effects of international politics on 
domestic politics and domestic structures on the international system). 
85 See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 
INT’L ORG. 427, 434 (1988) (conceiving of international relations as a two-level game, one at the 
national level and one at the international level). 
86 See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with 
Political Science, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 293, 300 (1985) (“[B]ehavior depends on the structure of 
the [voters’] utility functions, and . . . on their representations of the world in which they live, 
what they attend to in that world, and what beliefs they have about its nature.”). 
87 See Bryan D. Jones, Bounded Rationality and Political Science: Lessons from Public 
Administration and Public Policy, 13 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 395, 406-07 (2003) 
(explaining that a sound explanation of public administrative behavior must focus on information-
processing and not just principal–agent problems). 
88 See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.  
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analysis, although it might play a part. What we might know about the 
rationality of domestic policy and state preference formulation does not 
necessarily reflect upon the overall rationality of the state as an actor in 
pursuit of those preferences in the international environment. 
This theoretical uncertainty seems, however, to cut both ways. On one 
hand, in principle states can be imperfectly rational at the domestic level, 
yet perfectly rational at the international level. One might even 
hypothesize that the aggregation of differential bounded rationalities of 
various agents at the sub-state level produces some sort of perfect 
rationality of the state in international affairs. On the other hand, bounded 
rationality might simply carry over to the international plane, whether en 
banc or in subtle and variegated ways. 
We do not really know, in theory or in practice, how bounded 
rationalities interact with each other at different degrees of contingency, 
whether horizontally (within the state) or vertically (between the domestic 
environment and the international level). But this uncertainty only 
encourages behavioral analysis of international law. 
Perhaps more importantly, this discussion shows that the state 
(whether viewed as unitary or not) is a plausible individual unit to which 
behavioral economics can be applied, at least under particular informed 
circumstances—certainly no less so than traditional rational choice and 
L&E analyses. However, it also demonstrates that there is still much to 
learn and examine from a behavioral perspective if the state is to be 
regarded as such a unit of analysis. But we need not resolve these issues 
entirely; there is no question that sub-state entities, such as decisionmaking 
collectives and the individual, can also figure significantly in the study of 
behavioral international law. 
2. Decisionmaking Collectives in International Law 
A second response to the objection based on the individual focus of 
behavioral analysis would be to eschew state-level analysis, looking instead 
at the behavioral aspects of collective decisionmaking within states and 
other relevant entities, such as nonstate actors, international bureaucracies, 
and tribunals, that lead to outcomes in international law. In other words, no 
methodological statism would be involved. Rather, this second level of 
analysis recognizes that states do not make decisions relating to 
international law; people do—or most often, groups of people do. 
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There exists a significant behavioral literature on cognitive biases in 
small decisionmaking groups.89 In particular, there is an important debate 
on the existence and effects of “groupthink,” defined as the set of 
phenomena in which individuals comprising a decisionmaking group suffer 
“a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment 
that results from in-group pressures.”90 Small-group decisionmaking 
theories based on behavioral psychology have been applied in international 
politics (but not law) to decisions such as whether to embark in 
international interventions.91 Prospect theory has also been applied to 
relevant group decisions, including to foreign policy decisions and 
bureaucracies.92 There are even empirical studies examining the existence 
of decisionmaking biases in extremely large decisionmaking collectives, 
such as the U.S. electorate.93 In short, there is room to engage seriously in 
the study of the rationality of choices pertaining to international law at the 
decisionmaking group level of analysis. 
                                                        
89 See, e.g., Roland Bénabou, Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets, 80 
REV. ECON. STUD. 429, 438 (2013) (suggesting that a group member has the incentive to deny 
reality when the member’s colleagues are denying reality in a way that is harmful to the group); 
Norbert L. Kerr, Robert J. MacCoun & Geoffrey P. Kramer, Bias in Judgment: Comparing 
Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687, 696-98 (1996) (demonstrating theoretically that 
the process by which groups transform individual preferences into group decisions—majority rule, 
proportionality, or consensus—affects the degree of bias in the group). 
90 IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND 
FIASCOES 9 (2d ed. 1982); see also PAUL ’T HART, GROUPTHINK IN GOVERNMENT: A STUDY 
OF SMALL GROUPS AND POLICY FAILURE 5-12 (1990) (clarifying Janis’s groupthink as “an 
excessive form of concurrence-seeking” and delineating three antecedent conditions for it: high 
cohesiveness of the decisionmaking group, specific characteristics in the group’s organizational 
context, and stressful internal and external characteristics of the situation). But see Glen Whyte, 
Recasting Janis’s Groupthink Model: The Key Role of Collective Efficacy in Decision Fiascoes, 73 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESS 185, 194-97 (1998) (suggesting that it is 
not group cohesiveness, but high collective efficacy, or the “illusion of invulnerability,” which leads 
to groupthink symptoms, because it causes decisionmakers to perceive all choices as between 
maintaining an unacceptable status quo—“a sure loss”—or taking an action that if unsuccessful 
will lead to a greater loss but if successful will yield great gains). 
91 See VERTZBERGER, supra note 38, at 90-99 (surveying how social interaction affects a 
group’s ability to perceive and tolerate risk in four ways: by diluting each individual group 
member’s responsibility for a risky decision; by allowing more resolute members, who are usually 
risk-tolerant, to persuade others; by facilitating the exchange of information that often leads 
members to be more confident in their positions; and by revealing each group member’s risk 
tolerance). 
92 See generally ROSE MCDERMOTT, RISK-TAKING IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: 
PROSPECT THEORY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1998). 
93 See Adam J. Berinsky & Jeffrey B. Lewis, An Estimate of Risk Aversion in the U.S. Electorate, 
2 Q. J. POL. SCI. 139, 145-47 (2007) (concluding that American voters do not appear risk averse 
because uncertainty about a candidate’s policy position did not cause a statistically significant loss 
in the expected utility of voting for the candidate). 
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Analogies from corporate law are again illuminating, mutatis mutandis. 
For example, studies have shown that in some circumstances, lawyers 
practice herd behavior that results in the persistence of suboptimal 
provisions in bond indentures.94 Such reliance on inherited status quo, 
precedent, and group wisdom might be a response to individual bounded 
rationality, which could be countered by responsible board governance.95 It 
is not difficult to conceive research questions and testable hypotheses 
relating to similar occurrences of legal groupthink with respect to 
international law. For example, to what extent do legal advisors engaged in 
considering new international commitments, such as in the areas of climate 
change or trade agreements, rely on the legal status quo, instead of 
exercising their independent judgment on the best possible solutions? 
There are also studies that identify groupthink in collective corporate 
decisionmaking as a catalyst for unethical decisions that would not have 
been made individually and link the lack of diversity in corporate 
management to illegal acts by corporations.96 It would be illuminating to 
examine decisions by executive decisionmaking groups and governmental 
legal counsel to authorize acts that violate international law, such as some 
armed attacks or torture authorizations.97 
To be sure, looking into the state or within organizations and other 
collective units interacting with international law in this way could bring us 
back to the claim that behavioral traits observable at the individual level 
wash away at the collective level. Here the argument would be that internal 
decisionmaking settings have a corrective effect on individuals’ bounded 
rationality, leading to more perfect rationality in decisions made at the 
                                                        
94 See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing 
Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 355-56 (1996) (suggesting that 
“herd behavior” explains the adoption of standard contract terms even when customized terms 
would have greater expected value because a lawyer suffers more reputational harm if a failed 
contract contains customized terms than if it contains standard terms that many other lawyers 
have used in similar contexts). 
95 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2002) (proposing that if group decisionmaking reduces the information 
asymmetries among group members, a member will have less incentive to “herd,” or simply follow 
the ideas of presumably better informed colleagues). 
96 See Anthony J. Daboub et al., Top Management Team Characteristics and Corporate Illegal 
Activity, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 138, 157 (1995) (suggesting that homogeneity within a “top 
management team” increases pressures for conformity); Ronald R. Sims, Linking Groupthink to 
Unethical Behavior in Organizations, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 651, 654 (1992) (asserting that groupthink 
causes directors to overvalue each other’s approval and discount the ethical concerns of those 
outside the group).  
97 Thus, one wonders to what extent groupthink and other behavioral phenomena enabled the 
advice provided by U.S. Department of Justice lawyers relating to torture. See generally Jens David 
Ohlin, The Torture Lawyers, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 193 (2010). 
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leadership level. To illustrate, there are indications that within business 
corporations, individuals who are relative risk-takers and less prone to loss-
aversion rise disproportionately to corporate leadership echelons; it could 
follow that the corporate decisions made by the decisionmaking groups 
composed of these individuals are more in keeping with perfect 
rationality.98 If similar selection effects were shown to exist in parlia-
mentary politics or in military command promotions, this could have 
significant implications for understanding the rationality of group decisions 
in international law, in that they might actually have a relatively low level of 
biases and heuristics. Indeed, the result might even be that in some cases 
decisionmaking groups are more rational than individuals, to some extent 
vindicating traditional rational choice.99 
These are, however, only hypotheses and examples. The application of 
behavioral approaches to collective decisionmaking is far from simple. Even 
in economic fields, such as corporate and antitrust law, attempts to explore 
the impacts of cognitive biases on firm-level decisions have been few and 
far between. At this stage, the important point is that behavioral research 
on international law can be meaningfully conducted at this level of analysis, 
setting aside the individual methodology objection to a behavioral approach 
to international law. 
3. The Individual as a Subject and Decisionmaker in International Law 
A third response to the individualist methodological objection would 
be to simply focus on individual decisionmaking that relates to 
international law. The place of the individual is no longer in question or 
“prospective,” as it was half a century ago.100 In classical international law, 
individual actions may be attributed to the state, giving rise to state 
responsibility under various circumstances,101 and so analyses of individual 
                                                        
98 See Donald C. Langevoort, Heuristics Inside the Firm: Perspectives from Behavioral Law and 
Economics (positing that since promotion decisions are made based on observable results rather 
than unobservable innate skill of the candidates, successful risk-taking candidates who produce 
the highest results will be promoted), in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW, supra note 50, at 87, 93. 
99 For a model that attempts to prove this, see Andrew Farkas, Evolutionary Models in Foreign 
Policy Analysis, 40 INT’L STUD. Q. 343, 351, 355 (1996), which hypothesizes that selection effects, 
where the group member who recommends successful policies gains influence in the next round of 
decisionmaking, leads to an increase in the rationality of group decisions over time. 
100 See Ian Brownlie, The Place of the Individual in International Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 435, 435 
(1964) (“[T]he individual’s ‘place’ on the stage of world law remains generally diverse and, on the 
whole, prospective in nature.”). 
101 JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 121 (2002) (“In many cases, the 
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behavior are important for understanding state behavior. Put differently, 
many cases of compliance or noncompliance with international law are 
ultimately made by individuals, such as soldiers in the field, immigration 
officers, customs officials, and legal advisors. Moreover, in modern 
international law, individuals are increasingly direct addressees and 
beneficiaries of international law, especially in the areas of investment 
protection, international human rights, international criminal law, and 
international humanitarian law, the last constituting an area with major 
scope for behavioral research, as will be discussed in the next subsection. In 
addition, some state-to-state law takes into account, or is premised on, 
assumptions about private behavior, such as the World Trade Organization’s 
goal of “providing security and predictability” to traders.102 
The point need not be belabored here: behavioral analysis of 
international law is not restricted to unitary state behavior. There is a rich 
field of international legal issues that can be examined at the level of 
individual behavioral economics, in addition to the state level and group 
decisionmaking levels, whose application is more complex but with the 
potential to be at least as illuminating.  
B. The Empirical Foundations of Behavioral Theory 
It is perhaps the crowning achievement of behavioral analysis of law 
that it is based on claims about human behavior that are empirically 
substantiated. Some go so far as to say that “legal scholarship not drawing 
on empirical behavioral findings is not engaged in a behavioral analysis of 
law.”103 If the behavioral approach’s predictions about actors’ actions in the 
face of legal prescriptions are more dependable and realistic than those of 
standard rational choice theory with all its explanatory strengths, it is 
because of the behavioral approach’s empirical, and more so, experimental, 
basis. In this respect, an objection could be raised toward a behavioral 
approach to international law: that the empirical—and especially 
experimental—insights and methods of behavioral analysis are difficult, if 
not impossible, to apply to international law. 
Clearly, there are methodological difficulties in applying an 
experimental empirical approach to international law. At the state level, one 
                                                                                                                           
conduct which is acknowledged and adopted by a State will be that of private persons or 
entities.”). 
102 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.2, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
404. 
103 Tor, supra note 51, at 273. 
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cannot conduct experiments. At the group decisionmaking level, access to 
actual decisionmaking groups and senior decisionmakers is normally limited 
for most researchers. Experimental research with individuals also poses 
significant challenges. Access to real international law decisionmakers such 
as trade officials or military commanders for experimental purposes is also 
constrained. Even if achieved, it would be difficult to design experiments 
that replicate the real-life environment of decisionmaking. However, this 
objection merely underscores the nonempirical basis of most international 
legal research. Recent years have witnessed a growing cadre of legal 
scholars who apply quantitative and qualitative empirical research methods 
to international law.104 Nonbehavioral empirical research of international 
law encounters many of the same difficulties that behavioral research of 
international law would be faced with, and copes with them successfully. 
There are, in fact, a number of ways in which behavioral analysis could 
be meaningfully applied to international law, on the basis of empirical 
findings, experimental or not. In this sense, a behavioral approach to 
international law is no different than general behavioral legal research. 
Following Tor’s useful menu for research,105 behavioral insights on the law 
can be gained through three complementary channels: (1) theoretical 
applications, (2) experimental research, and (3) field studies. The strengths 
and weaknesses of each methodology should be recognized, but each of 
them retains an empirical basis and could be applied to different 
                                                        
104 See, e.g., GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC–PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION (2003) (using WTO data to determine the social, political, 
and legal implications for the U.S. and European approaches to public–private networks in 
international governance); Marc L. Busch & Krzysztof J. Pelc, Ruling Not to Rule: The Use of 
Judicial Economy by WTO Panels (using data from WTO panel reports to analyze the relationship 
between mixed submissions and the exercise of judicial economy), in THE POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 263, 276 (Tomer Broude, Marc L. Busch & Amelia Porges 
eds., 2011); Susan D. Franck, Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty Dispute 
Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 767, 784 (2008) (finding that “international economic law has 
tangible international law obligations in treaties, and there is associated data that are ripe for 
empirical analysis”); Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 588, 598 (2007) (using “a hazard analysis to test the strength of the specific 
predictions regarding states’ willingness to commit to human rights treaties”); Krzysztof J. Pelc, 
Googling the WTO: What Search-Engine Data Tell Us About the Political Economy of Institutions, 67 
INT’L ORG. 629, 631 (2013) (relying on search-engine data to analyze behavioral reactions to 
violations of international law). For an overview, see generally Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, 
The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012).  
105 See Tor, supra note 51, at 272-91 (“A review of extant scholarship in the behavioral approach 
as defined here reveals two distinct, albeit closely related, methodological genes. The more 
common involves theoretical applications of behavioral evidence generated by non-legal, 
empirical, scholarship. Its rarer but important counterpart genre conducts direct empirical, mostly 
experimental, tests of legally relevant questions.”). 
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international legal puzzles, showing that this objection is definitely not one 
that can stop behavioral analysis of international law at the threshold. 
1. Theoretical Applications 
Theoretical applications take research scenarios in which a divergence 
from perfect rationality is noted on the basis of general empirical evidence, 
and then apply the ramifications to a legal rule or institution. The 
application is theoretical in the sense that although it is empirically valid in 
one area, it is being applied in a different legal field and set of 
circumstances; hence, empirical authority is reduced. This migrational 
methodology will be familiar to most interdisciplinary legal scholars: 
theoretical knowledge from non-legal fields is adopted and applied to legal 
issues; empirical knowledge from one field of law migrates to another. In 
international legal research, theoretical application could also include cases 
in which insights from behavioral economics in other areas of law are 
applied to international law, or instances in which nonlegal IR research on 
behavior of states and other actors has international legal implications. 
For example, theoretical applications of cognitive psychology challenge 
the traditional rational choice parameters of deterrence in criminal law106 by 
suggesting (among other points) that optimism or overconfidence biases 
could cause potential offenders to underestimate the probability that they 
will be apprehended and convicted. Moreover, the availability bias might 
mean that visibly increased enforcement has a greater effect on deterrence 
than increased punishment.107 These are both theoretical applications of 
general expressions of bounded rationality to a legal issue, with 
implications for criminal enforcement policy. Given that a central goal of 
international criminal justice is deterrence and prevention of future 
international crimes by punishing existing ones,108 any theoretical 
                                                        
106 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 
180 (1968) (describing the deterrence parameter as a function of p, the probability of conviction, 
and f, the punishment). 
107 Jolls, supra note 70, at 277 (suggesting that availability bias predicts that potential parking 
violators would be more likely to be deterred if the risk of receiving a parking ticket was more 
salient and vivid).  
108 Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate 
Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 787 (2006) (“The deterrence rationale for 
[international criminal tribunals] usually takes the form of a generalized argument in favor of 
justice for perpetrators of humanitarian atrocities and in opposition to impunity and 
realpolitik.”); Otto Triffterer, The Preventive and Repressive Function of the International Criminal 
Court, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO 
IMPUNITY 137, 144 (M. Politi and G. Nesi eds., 2001); see also Invited Experts on Prevention 
Question, ICC FORUM, http://iccforum.com/prevention (last visited Feb. 27, 2015), archived at 
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application of behavioral psychology to criminal law would by extension be 
relevant to international criminal law. 
However, this example demonstrates the main weakness of theoretical 
application as a methodology: the external validity challenge, which creates 
and augments the difficulty in transferring empirical findings from one 
research group to another group that differs from the first in its personality 
and environment.109 To what extent can behavioral traits established in 
experimental research among college students under laboratory conditions 
be applicable to criminals? To what extent can theories applied to criminals 
in the setting of domestic law and society be reapplied to potential war 
criminals acting in very different circumstances and under very different 
utility functions? When the external validity—or generalizability—of 
behavioral inferences is questionable, theoretical applications can still be 
highly useful because they have the ability to generate interesting 
hypotheses. However, these hypotheses would then need to be tested 
against relevant empirical evidence through field studies or experimental 
research. To be sure, this will not always be possible, in which case the 
behavioral insights should be understood as bearing reduced research value, 
but not less than that of nonempirical methods. 
2. Experimental Research 
Experimental behavioral legal research entails controlled and 
randomized experiments in which participants’ reactions to different 
treatments in legal settings are polled and statistically compared, within 
experimental and control groups. This allows the researcher “to draw 
conclusions about the causal effects of the experimental treatment.”110 For 
example, groups of randomly selected students can be asked to play the role 
of trial jurors and to answer certain questions with different fact patterns. 
In international legal issues, the same groups could be asked to pose as 
individuals in combat settings with respect to rules of international 
humanitarian law, or as regular citizens with respect to human rights issues. 
While the strength of experimental research lies in its controlled and 
randomized environment, this is also the source of its weakness. Again we 
are faced with the problem of external validity. Both the subjects and the 
                                                                                                                           
http://perma.cc/T7QX-NUCJ (summarizing expert opinions on the question of the role of the 
International Criminal Court in crime prevention). 
109 See Tor, supra note 51, at 280 (“Th[e] [external validity] problem concerns the validity of 
inferences about whether the . . . effect . . . holds over variations in persons, settings, treatment 
variables, and measurement variables.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
110 Id. at 285. 
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circumstances are very different from those that govern in reality. Although 
there is evidence that behavioral simulations and surveys, properly 
conducted, can provide reliable evidence that conforms to results from the 
field,111 experimental research is often treated with suspicion in the social 
sciences as lacking in its realism and generalizability.112 Nevertheless, some 
scholars contend that most of the objections to experimental research are 
misguided and that more experimental social science research should be 
conducted as a significant complement to and corroboration of field 
research.113 Behavioral legal research—certainly with respect to 
international law—faces similar dilemmas; but ultimately, their resolution 
will depend on the ability to conduct meaningful experimental research on 
particular research questions, and researchers should take cognizance of this 
in both their selection of research topics and in the design of experiments. 
For example, experimental studies relating to international humanitarian 
law or trade law can be upgraded by conducting controlled experiments 
with groups of relevant decisionmakers, such as military commanders and 
trade officials and executives, respectively.114 
3. Field Studies 
Experimental research is not the only way to gather empirically valid 
information about the way people make decisions. Indeed, some consider 
field research, which uses observational testing of real behavior, to be the 
first-best method. A significant criticism leveled at the behavioral L&E 
movement is that knowledge gleaned from experiments is limited in its 
ability to provide guidance for real life policy because it lacks context, and 
                                                        
111 Craig A. Anderson, James J. Lindsay & Brad J. Bushman, Research in the Psychological 
Laboratory: Truth or Triviality?, 8 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 3, 8 (1999) (“The 
obvious conclusion from Figure 1 is that the psychological laboratory is doing quite well in terms 
of external validity . . . .”).  
112 Id. at 3 (summarizing the opposing view that “research from the psychological laboratory is 
extremely invalid, and therefore pointless”). 
113 See, e.g., Armin Falk & James J. Heckman, Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge 
in the Social Sciences, 326 SCI. 535, 537 (2009) (“Experiments can be productive in complementing 
the information obtained from other empirical methods. One can combine lab and field 
experiments to better understand the mechanisms observed in the field.”).  
114 Notably, international relations scholars have recently turned to experimental research, 
some of it relating to international law. See Alex Mintz, Yi Yang & Rose McDermott, Experimental 
Approaches to International Relations, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 493, 494-98 (2011) (describing five types 
of experiments used in international relations); see also Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 72 
(manuscript at 4-5) (“By studying both populations using identical experimental instruments we 
explore not just how behavioral traits relate to policy preferences for trade cooperation but also 
help reveal how non-elite samples may differ from real policy elites.”).  
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should be at least supplemented by field observations.115 However, 
observational testing of behavioral questions in legal contexts is still rare.116 
In this respect, international legal research might actually have significant 
strengths. At the state level of analysis, the relevant research group for 
observational field research is limited to under 200 entities, with a vast 
historical background for research. This can foment quantitative research, 
in fields such as international litigation, which although on the rise is still 
much easier to track in terms of volume than the domestic judicial activity 
of even a small state. Qualitative empirical research is quite developed, such 
as in international political economy. One can glean a lot of information on 
decisionmaking processes117 given this long historical memory.118 
Quantitatively, international relations researchers have already compiled 
historical databases that can be relevant to ex post observational testing of 
legal issues; one example is the Correlates of War (COW) project.119 Field 
studies at the individual level are difficult but possible.120 
In sum, there is no a priori reason to discard the idea of conducting 
empirical behavioral research in international law. Instead, it is quite the 
contrary: such research can be conducted in all three methodological 
streams (theoretical application, experimental research and field studies) in 
meaningful ways. 
C. The Parsimony of Traditional Concepts of State Rationality 
The final general objection to a behavioral approach to international 
law would be that its high degree of contingency—on actors, environments, 
and levels of analysis—would make it unparsimonious, in contrast with the 
parsimony that characterizes traditional economic or rational choice 
                                                        
115 See Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavioral 
Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 973, 1002-03 (2000) (“Legal scholarship that 
seeks to incorporate the insights of empirical social science must be aware of the limitations of 
such knowledge. Before laboratory results can serve as the basis for legal policy, they must be 
replicated in field studies that resemble as closely as possible ‘natural’ conditions. And proposed 
interventions must be tried in small-scale pilot studies before they are implemented broadly.”).  
116 See Tor, supra note 51, at 281 (“Observational tests of legal questions have become 
increasingly popular in recent decades, although still relatively uncommon compared to 
traditional legal scholarship.”). 
117 See supra note 104.  
118 See, e.g., Barbara Farnham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: Insights from Prospect Theory, 13 
POL. PSYCHOL. 205, 225 (1992) (applying prospect theory to an analysis of President Roosevelt’s 
behavior in the Munich hostage crisis). 
119 See CORRELATES WAR, http://www.correlatesofwar.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/Q33B-7TRS.  
120 See Fellmeth, supra note 6, at 134-35 (recognizing criticisms of previous studies for failing 
to collect actual battlefield data and undertaking a study of state practice). 
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analyses of law and international relations. This is certainly true; indeed, 
experimental literature has over time discovered so many cognitive biases, 
sometimes contradictory, that it is dangerous to make generalizations in 
research. This critique would not, however, be unique to international 
behavioral analysis, and the response provided by behavioralists would 
apply here as well. The parsimony achieved through rational choice theory 
comes at the expense of empirical accuracy and predictive power.121 Ideally, 
one should have both parsimony and accuracy. But ultimately, so long as 
such an approach is not at hand, whether one prefers one method or 
another is very much a question of both intellectual temperament and the 
balance between accuracy and parsimony—how much of one is sacrificed 
for the sake of the other. There would seem to be little to add to this 
debate, but I would venture the following. A behavioral approach to 
international law would not—and should not—underwrite a claim to 
providing a theory of everything or even a theory of international law. It 
would simply be an addition to the arsenal of methodologies of 
international law, like rational choice or sociological approaches, applicable 
and illuminating in some contexts, less so in others. Within the bounds of 
those discrete areas in which it is both illuminating and intellectually 
honest, it would be parsimonious, although parsimony should not be 
confused with simplicity. So, for example, if behavioral research would 
show that military field commanders do not currently or usually take the 
remote possibility of international criminal prosecution as a consideration 
in their operative calculations, but in contrast are deterred by domestic (and 
more “available”) sanctions, such as investigations by committees of inquiry 
and demotions, this specific finding would in itself be parsimonious, as well 
as empirically accurate. Therefore, the risk of a lower degree of parsimony 
in behavioral analysis is a methodological constraint to consider in the 
design of research, but it is not a threshold barrier to it. 
IV. SOME INDICATIVE APPLICATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH TO 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES 
So far, potential uses of behavioral research on international law have 
been mentioned only in passing. In this Part, I will describe in more detail 
select indicative applications of behavioral international research. By no 
means should this discussion be mistaken for actual behavioral research. 
                                                        
121 See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 47, at 20-21 (“[T]o the extent that conventional 
economics achieves parsimony, it often does so at the expense of any real predictive power.”); see 
also Elms, supra note 33, at 240-42 (examining the role played by behavioral economics and 
political psychology in economic decisionmaking).  
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Rather, it comprises a set of prototypical research briefs and proposals, 
which indicate in concrete yet general terms how behavioral research 
projects could be conducted with respect to international legal questions. It 
is a methodological tasting menu, an invitation for research. To be sure, as 
noted above, there exist already some very thoughtful first buds of such 
research. 
The research issues discussed below have been selected so as to allow 
for the full range of applicable levels of analysis (the state, small 
decisionmaking groups, and individuals) discussed above in Section III.A, 
and the full spectrum of behavioral research methods (theoretical 
application, experimental research, and field studies) discussed in Section 
III.B. They have also been selected to display both explanatory and 
normative avenues of research and the ways in which behavioral research 
can be either linked to rational choice frameworks or disengaged from 
them. Finally, they cover a broad range of international legal issues, from 
general international law and dispute settlement to international economic 
and humanitarian law. The queries addressed are: (A) how can international 
treaty-making be made more efficient?; (B) do collegial international 
tribunals produce better outcomes than non-collegial ones?; and (C) should 
international humanitarian law relating to target selection in armed conflict 
take into account the bounded rationality of military commanders and 
decisionmakers? 
A. The State Level: The Efficiency of International Law-Making 
and the Status Quo Bias 
When can international lawmaking be deemed efficient? L&E scholars 
have over the last decade or so devoted copious attention to explanations of 
international lawmaking processes, especially their two central sources: 
treaties and customary international law.122 A subset of this literature 
criticizes international lawmaking as inefficient. In particular, scholars have 
argued that international law does not adapt quickly or reflexively enough 
to the preferences of states and the needs of the global community. Thus, 
for example, international legal responses to global warming and 
                                                        
122 See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 23, at 1116-20 (discussing the origins of, compliance 
with, and evolution of customary international law); Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary 
International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 115, 131-75 (2005) (outlining a theory of customary 
international law rooted in rational choice); George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary 
International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541, 544-73 (2005) (presenting a rationalist model of 
customary international law); see also Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 
1601-10 (2005) (discussing nations’ adoption of and exit from international treaties). 
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transnational terrorism remain blocked.123 In this Section, I will focus on a 
particular critique of the efficiency of treaty formation, setting aside 
discussion of critiques relating to customary international law as such.124 
With respect to treaty law, Guzman has argued that the chief cause for 
lack of progress toward effective global legal solutions is in many cases 
international law’s strict requirement of consent in treaty-making:125 states 
may be bound by treaty norms only if they have expressly consented to 
them.126 Hence, so long as some states can object to new treaty 
arrangements or to reforms of existing ones solely on the basis of their 
narrow self-interest, they can prevent legal responses that satisfy the 
collective interests of the international community. According to Guzman, 
the consent requirement should be relaxed in ways that would enable the 
global community to create law that would bind states non-consensually.127 
What is most important for present purposes, however, is that 
Guzman’s analysis builds on understandings of efficiency that lie firmly 
within the standard economic approach to contract law. This approach 
regards private contracts as efficient in the Coasean sense: bargaining 
among parties will lead to an allocation of rights and obligations that 
optimizes their preferences, regardless of initial allocations, provided that 
transaction costs are at zero or are very low.128 The economic model of 
contract law can be similarly extended to international treaties. States, 
considered as unitary actors, enjoy substantial freedom in the pursuit of 
their interests through bilateral and multilateral treaty-making, in a manner 
reminiscent of the private ordering achieved through the freedom of 
                                                        
123 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (examining the lack of treaty or customary 
international law solutions to problems such as global warming or terrorism). 
124 See GUZMAN, supra note 7, at 170-71 (discussing efficiency considerations involved in 
membership in international agreements); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing 
from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 208-15 (2010) (discussing the relationship between 
international treaties and customary international law); Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in 
International Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 859, 895-906 (2006) (exploring the efficiency of 
customary international law).  
125 Andrew T. Guzman, Against Consent, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 747, 751 (2012). 
126 See LOUIS HENKIN, 18 INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 28 (1995) (“No 
treaty, old or new, whatever its character or subject, is binding on a state unless it has consented to 
it.”); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2.1(g), art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (defining a “party” to a treaty as a State that has consented to be bound by it and 
unambiguously providing that “[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third 
State without its consent”). 
127 In particular, Guzman advocates for increased use of nonconsensual rulemaking 
procedures in international organizations, though stopping short of “limitless delegation of 
authority.” See Guzman, supra note 125, at 789-90.  
128 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 85 (6th ed. 2012). 
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contract in domestic legal settings.129 From a rational choice perspective, 
this can lead to welfare analyses familiar from contract theory, such as 
efficient breach.130 
Thus, where treaty obligations are entered into on an informed and 
voluntary basis, rational choice models generally assume that international 
multilateral rules are efficient with respect to parties’ preferences, at least at 
the time that these obligations are made. The classical Paretian formulation 
posited by Trachtman states in this respect that “[i]n the cooperative treaty 
game, any treaty must be such that, at least in prospective terms, each 
adherent receives a benefit that is at least as great as it would receive if it 
did not join in the treaty.”131 As Guzman explains, a Pareto-efficient 
improvement in treaty law (whether reforms to an existing treaty regime or 
the launch of a new one) would entail that at least some parties gain from 
it, but none are made worse off by it (compared with the prevailing legal 
situation prior to the change).132 In contrast, a Kaldor–Hicks efficient treaty 
improvement would be such that the benefit granted to some states from 
the change would be greater than the disadvantage caused to other states; in 
other words, aggregate utility is increased, although there are winners and 
losers in a distributive sense.133 To Guzman, the strict consent requirement 
in international lawmaking epitomizes a Pareto concept of efficiency; 
aggregate welfare is sacrificed to the maintenance of individual state 
welfare.134 
There are several difficulties with this analysis, but let me focus on one 
that highlights the possible theoretical application of insights from 
behavioral economics. Guzman’s compelling analysis against consent 
assumes first that states will, as a rule, agree to changes in treaty law if they 
benefit from them or at the very least do not suffer from them (Pareto 
efficient treaty reform) or if they are counted among the winners from a 
                                                        
129 See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 244 (1993) 
(“[I]f two parties are to be observed entering into a contract, one should normally presume that 
they would not have done so unless they felt that the contract was likely to make them better 
off.”). 
130 See, for example, discussion of ex post “efficient breach” with respect to international 
treaties in TRACHTMAN, supra note 7, at 142-44. See also ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. 
STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 84-109 (2006) (advancing the “optimal enforcement” theory of 
international law); Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International Law: Optimal 
Remedies, “Legalized Noncompliance,” and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L. REV. 243, 246-64 (2011) 
(discussing the concept of “efficient breach” in the context of international treaties). 
131 TRACHTMAN, supra note 7, at 128.  
132 Guzman, supra note 125, at 758. 
133 Id. 
134 Id.  
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Kaldor–Hicks efficient treaty change. In the face of these rationality-based 
assumptions, cognitive psychology provides a startling insight: all things 
considered, people actually have a tendency to prefer an existing state of 
affairs over alternatives that might leave them better off. This is referred to 
as the status quo bias. Experiments with individuals show that they 
disproportionately prefer the status quo over alternatives when making 
decisions: “Faced with new options, decision makers often stick with the 
status quo alternative, for example, to follow customary company policy, to 
elect an incumbent to still another term in office, to purchase the same 
product brands, or to stay in the same job.”135 This phenomenon is 
conceptually related to the endowment effect, in the sense that people view 
the existing state of affairs as an endowment that they value more than 
possibly improved conditions, which they associate with risk and 
uncertainty. 
The status quo bias has distinct implications for the development of 
legal systems and arrangements, both domestic and international. 
Generally, it suggests that contracts will be inherently “sticky” and 
inefficient because agents prefer to keep the law as it is, even when the law 
lags behind changes in their otherwise rational interests and preferences, 
and even in the face of personal, commercial, or other developments.136 
A more advanced application of the status quo bias relates to default 
rules—rules that apply in the absence of a specific agreement to apply 
different rules. Coasean economics predicts that default rules—the initial 
legal arrangement—will not affect bargained contractual arrangements, 
unless precluded by transaction costs, and so their effect in real legal 
relations is minimal. Yet experimental research conducted among private 
contractors has confirmed the status quo bias and shown that default rules 
matter; there is a tendency to adopt them in negotiated settings, even if 
they are inefficient. Thus, default rules are not just a fallback when certain 
issues are left open in contracts; they have an effect on negotiated contracts 
as well. These phenomena have been observed not only in relation to 
default rules established by law but also with respect to standard form or 
boilerplate terms that are not ex ante binding upon parties.137 
                                                        
135 William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988).  
136 For a survey of evidence of status quo bias and an application to contract law, see generally 
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998). 
137 See id. at 630-33; see also Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The 
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1587-88 (1998) (“Th[e] 
preference for default terms is evident even when transaction costs of contracting around the 
default are very low and there is no strategic advantage in choosing not to contract around the 
default.”). 
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What does this imply for the critique of the strict consent 
requirement’s efficiency in treaty-making? The immediate implication is 
that states might regularly withhold consent from new treaty regimes and 
treaty reforms, not only because they believe these regimes and reforms run 
counter to their best interests, but because of an embedded behavioral 
aversion to change. 
Thus, where Guzman sees the consent requirement as the cause for an 
observed status quo bias in international treaty law,138 it might be that the 
“excessive commitment to consent”139 that he decries is in fact the formal 
result of a behavioral status quo bias. States preserve the constraints of the 
consent requirement because it enables them to pursue their (imperfectly 
rational) preference for status quo. In some respects this makes the critique 
even stronger because it indicates that the consent requirement may even 
facilitate the scuttling of treaty regimes and reforms that would be Pareto-
efficient (i.e., when no state has a rational reason to object), not just those 
that are Kaldor–Hicks efficient. Treaty reform can therefore be exceedingly 
difficult even when everybody stands to gain. 
The policy implications of this theoretical application are that relaxing 
the consent requirement would not be sufficient to solve the problem. In 
many cases, states will still eschew formal legal change. Even in 
majoritarian and institutional rulemaking settings in international 
organizations, states might prefer to maintain the rulemaking status quo of 
consent, despite the existence of alternative formal possibilities. A living 
example is the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although the WTO’s 
institutional provisions allow for various forms of majority decisionmaking, 
including amendments to the substantive treaties,140 members rarely resort 
to these provisions, and a culture of consensus continues to govern 
decisionmaking.141 
Beyond merely refining the critique of consent, acknowledging 
behavioral status quo bias in treaty-making among states also gives rise to 
interesting research questions and hypotheses that might be examined 
empirically. For example, better knowledge of the real incidence and impact 
                                                        
138 It appears that Guzman intends the term in a colloquial rather than behavioral sense. See 
Guzman, supra note 125, at 790 (“The overcommitment to state control over events creates a 
suffocating status quo bias that does more harm than good.”). 
139 See id. at 749. 
140 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization arts. IX-X, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
141 See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, Decision-Making in the World Trade 
Organization: Is the Consensus Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising 
and Implementing Rules on International Trade?, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 51, 55 (2005) (indicating that 
“the process of decision-making in the WTO is dominated by the practice of consensus”). 
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of status quo bias in treaty-making can affect strategies for treaty reform 
demandeurs. Multilateral treaty law can be developed in at least four ways: 
(a) negotiations leading to the replacement of existing treaty regimes (e.g., 
the negotiation of the WTO Agreements as a comprehensive replacement 
of GATT142 and patchwork of associated trade agreements that existed at 
the time); (b) negotiation of new commitments within an existing treaty 
regime, as mandatory (or partially mandatory), additional or revised 
commitments (essentially, treaty amendments like the procedures 
mentioned above as formally available in the WTO143 and amendments to 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute144); (c) optional 
negotiations (e.g., the additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions145 
and to the main human rights covenants146); and (d) negotiations conducted 
entirely outside existing substantive treaty regimes (e.g., the recently 
concluded (but not yet in force) Arms Trade Treaty, which was negotiated 
within the U.N. but is independent of other arms control conventions147). 
Even though the negotiated legal changes would be identical, each of these 
approaches works with different default rules and environments. A 
combination of quantitative and qualitative research would show which 
strategy is more successful in practice (although other explanations beyond 
status quo bias could be proffered). 
                                                        
142 See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 
Stat. pts. 5 & 6, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
143 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
144 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
(entered into force July 1, 2002). Amendments were adopted during the 2010 review conference, 
notably with respect to the definition of the crime of aggression. See Jennifer Trahan, The Rome 
Statute’s Amendment on the Crime of Aggression: Negotiations at the Kampala Review Conference, 11 
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 49, 55 (2011) (detailing the amendments to the Rome Statute). The time of 
entry into effect of these amendments may vary among states party to the Rome Statute; indeed 
the amendment process includes elements of majority lawmaking. See id. at 85 (highlighting the 
ultimate decision to allow states to accept amendments by ratification). 
145 See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 (amending the Geneva Convention to more adequately protect victims of armed 
conflicts); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609 (supplementing the Geneva Convention to “ensure a better protection for the 
victims of those armed conflicts”). 
146 See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) 
(exemplifying an optional protocol within a treaty). 
147 See Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, Mar. 18-28, 2013, Report of 
the Final United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.217/2013/2 (Apr. 
2, 2013). 
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Perhaps even more intriguing would be research comparing the 
willingness of states to contract out, inter partes, from customary 
international rules,148 compared with applicable multilateral treaty rules and 
various “soft law” sources.149 Such a study would not assume the existence 
of status quo bias, but attempt to establish its existence and compare the 
relative stickiness of custom, convention, and (nonbinding) soft law as 
default rules. 
Indeed, there is much to consider further regarding behavioral insights 
on the efficiency of the development of customary international law,150 but 
my limited goal here is to present only selected indicative applications, and 
these considerations must be reserved for future research. 
B. Small Decisionmaking Groups: Judicial Design and 
Conformity Effects in International Tribunals 
The relatively recent rise of judicialization in international law151 
provides fertile ground for behavioral studies on international courts as 
decisionmakers. Psychological research has been applied to domestic judges 
                                                        
148 In principle, states can contract around customary international law: “There is no a 
priori hierarchy between treaty and custom as sources of international law. However, in the 
application of international law, relevant norms deriving from a treaty will prevail between the 
parties over norms deriving from customary law.” INST. OF INT’L LAW, PROBLEMS ARISING 
FROM A SUCCESSION OF CODIFICATION: CONVENTIONS ON A PARTICULAR SUBJECT (1995), 
available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1995_lis_01_en.pdf. This principle does not 
apply if the customary rules in question are considered to be jus cogens—which permit no 
derogation. See Vienna Convention, supra note 126, art. 53 (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its 
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.”). 
149 On soft law, see generally Gregory Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard and Soft Law, in 
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 14, at 197. 
150 See, e.g., Bradley & Gulati, supra note 124, at 252 (arguing that customary international law 
is inefficient because it is too rigid, pursuant to the mandatory doctrine whereby states cannot 
legally opt out from a customary rule of international law after it has been formed). Interestingly, 
where the previously mentioned critique of treaty-formation argued that international law was 
inefficiently inflexible because it did not allow for non-consensual rules, this critique of customary 
law calls for states to be released from obligations to which they did not expressly commit. It is 
not entirely clear what type of efficiency Bradley and Gulati take as their point of reference, but 
as far as behavioral insights are concerned, one could at least hypothesize that the removal of 
doctrinal or formal constraints on opt-outs from customary law would not achieve an increase in 
normative efficiency. A behavioral status quo bias, taking existing customary rules as the default, 
would lead states to generally retain their normative loyalties. Bradley and Gulati only briefly 
mention the possibility that psychological factors contribute to the stickiness of customary 
international law. See id. at 248 n.196 (citing Korobkin, supra note 136). For further discussion of 
custom as default rules, see Rachel Brewster, Withdrawing from Custom: Choosing Between Default 
Rules, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 47 (2010). 
151 See Shany, supra note 4, at 74-76 (tracking the increased use of courts and the expansion of 
the court’s power in international law). 
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as individual decisionmakers152 and to courts as small decisionmaking 
groups, with rich and interesting results.153 There is no reason to think that 
such research methods would not be applicable to international judges and 
tribunals, or indeed, that research results from the domestic sphere could 
not carry over, under certain conditions and, mutatis mutandis, to the 
international domain as well. Behavioral research thus may hold significant 
implications for the design of courts and tribunals.154 
As an example, consider the ongoing debate regarding the desirability 
of dissenting opinions in the WTO. The WTO dispute settlement system, 
entailing state-to-state litigation relating to international trade law, is one 
of today’s most active international tribunals. Disputes are addressed by ad 
hoc panels and may be appealed to the standing Appellate Body.155 
Dissenting or separate opinions are allowed, subject to certain formal rules 
and practices, including a requirement that the dissenter remain 
anonymous.156 Such opinions are, however, formally discouraged157 and are 
in fact very rare.158 
                                                        
152 See, e.g., Dan Simon, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Look Through the Lens of 
Cognitive Psychology, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1097, 1113-14 (2002) (applying cognitive psychology 
experiments “to examine the process that governs mental tasks that require integrating multiple, 
ambiguous, and conflicting components into discrete choices,” the mental process that judges 
apply in determining a legal controversy). 
153 For two compendia of the state of the art, neither of which include reference to 
international tribunals, see THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (David E. 
Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010); and Doron Teichman & Eyal Zamir, Judicial Decision-
Making: A Behavioral Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVORIAL ECONOMICS 
AND THE LAW 664 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014). 
154 For a survey of the political science literature on international tribunals, see Mark A. 
Pollack, Political Science and International Adjudication, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 357, 361-69 (Cesare Pr. Romano, Karen J. Alter & Yuval Shany 
eds., 2014). None of the literature includes applications of cognitive psychology to international 
judges. 
155 For a broad set of analyses of the WTO dispute settlement system, see generally THE 
WTO AT TEN: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (Giorgio 
Sacerdoti, Alan Yanovich & Jan Bohanes eds., 2006). 
156 The condition of anonymity applies at both the panel and Appellate Body levels. See 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures, supra note 102, art. 14.3, art. 17.11. In passing, anonymity 
itself raises interesting behavioral hypotheses. On one hand, anonymity ostensibly protects 
dissenting panelists or Appellate Body members seeking reappointment from individual scrutiny 
by member states. For a discussion of the potential role of dissent in reappointment, see Manfred 
Elsig & Mark A. Pollack, Agents, Trustees and International Courts: The Politics of Judicial 
Appointment at the World Trade Organization, 20 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 391, 406-07 (2014). On the 
other hand, anonymity reduces prestige payoffs associated with the signed separate opinion. 
157 Appellate Body Report, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, ¶ 3.2, WT/AB/WP/6 (Aug. 
16, 2010) (requiring the Appellate Body members to make every effort to take decisions by consensus). 
158 See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 895, 899 (2006) (“Since the WTO’s inception, less than 6% of panel reports and less 
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The WTO is not unique in this respect. In some domestic judicial 
settings, even when judges are permitted to write separate opinions, they 
often refrain from doing so. The option to write a dissenting opinion may 
actually encourage “adversarial collaboration” on the bench, leading to a 
high proportion of unanimous opinions in some domestic courts.159 
Members of the United States Supreme Court largely avoided writing 
individual opinions for over a century.160 Moreover, decisions of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) do not include dissents.161 
However, the question of dissent is of particular importance in new 
tribunals—as most international courts are—as it interacts with the 
establishment of legitimacy in uncertain ways.162 
Meredith Kolsky Lewis comprehensively canvassed many institutional 
and historical reasons explaining the lack of dissent in WTO rulings, while 
strongly arguing that an increase in dissenting opinions, certainly at the 
panel level, would have positive effects on the quality of decisions and the 
development of international trade law.163 She advocates removal of the 
formal preference for consensus and several additional steps that would 
encourage separate opinions.164 
In contrast, James Flett has argued equally forcefully that panel 
dissents have not had any appreciable effect on decisional quality, that the 
“collective intelligence of reasonable judges should lead them to common 
ground,” and that the overall collegiality of panels and the Appellate Body 
                                                                                                                           
than 2% of Appellate Body reports have included dissenting opinions.”). It should be noted that 
the number of dissents has risen in recent years but largely due to a particular line of disputes 
regarding U.S. Department of Commerce practices of “zeroing” in dumping investigations. 
159 See Marsha S. Berzon, Dissent, “Dissentals,” and Decision Making, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1479, 
1485-89 (2012) (discussing experience writing opinions as a federal judge on the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals).  
160 See Stacia L. Haynie, Leadership and Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 54 J. POL. 1158, 
1159 fig.1 (1992) (depicting the spike in concurring and dissenting opinions that has occurred only 
recently at the Supreme Court). 
161 The practice of Advocate-General opinions preceding those of the CJEU allows for some 
diversity of reasoning. For discussion, see generally Josef Azizi, Unveiling the EU Courts’ Internal 
Decision-Making Process: A Case for Dissenting Opinions?, 12 ERA F. 49 (2011). 
162 Speaking with one voice can bolster the position of a court; but enabling dissent projects 
diversity and signals confidence. For a discussion of this tension in the early years of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, see Meredith Kolsky, Justice William Johnson and the History of the Supreme Court 
Dissent, 83 GEO. L.J. 2069, 2070-82 (1995). 
163 See Lewis, supra note 158, at 917-19, 923 (arguing that WTO dissents can improve judicial 
decisions, serve as markers for future decisionmaking, and spur legislators to respond to problems 
with the law). 
164 See id. at 928 (concluding that dissents should no longer be discouraged by the WTO). 
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should be preserved.165 Others have also praised the high degree of 
consensus in the Appellate Body in particular.166 
This fascinating debate could benefit from behavioral insights, which it 
currently lacks. Notably, the existing debate relies neither on L&E analysis 
nor on a particular formulation of rationality. Instead, it relies on differing 
interpretations of institutional settings and judicial outcomes. Behavioral 
questions arise nevertheless. Beyond the institutional and formal 
constraints on dissent, are there cognitive elements in judicial behavior at 
the WTO that limit dissent? And how might these factors influence the 
assessment of the quality of consensus decisions? 
In the United States,167 there is a long tradition of theoretical and 
empirical examination of issues by collegial courts (i.e., courts that reach 
decisions as a group, with or without dissent168), as opposed to individual 
judges.169 The use of such multimember courts is justified by the notion 
that deliberation in a small, high-level group of jurists will help the court 
arrive at the correct decision.170 However, it creates strategic interactions 
between members of the court because no judge individually has the 
authority to determine the outcome. Judges in collegial courts inevitably 
must consider the views of their colleagues. These interactions are not only 
strategic, but also personal, entailing psychological elements,171 which open 
the door to cognitive and social psychology analysis.172 
                                                        
165 James Flett, Collective Intelligence and the Possibility of Dissent: Anonymous Individual 
Opinions in WTO Jurisprudence, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 287, 287, 310 (2010). 
166 See Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, The WTO Appellate Body’s Decision-Making Process: A Perfect 
Model For International Adjudication?, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 289, 289 (2009) (“The functioning of 
the Appellate Body (AB) is virtually perfect in terms of collegial decision-making.”). 
167 This is the case in other jurisdictions, including Canada. See Emmett Macfarlane, Essay, 
Consensus and Unanimity at the Supreme Court of Canada, 52 SUP. CT. L. REV. 379, 390-400 (2010).  
168 The terms “collegial” and “collegiality” in the WTO are usually used in the narrower 
sense, meaning all members of a panel or division of the Appellate Body agree to the same ruling.  
169 Much of this literature pursues or engages with the so-called attitudinal approach, which is 
primarily concerned with the influence of political or ideological attitudes of judges on their 
decisions, especially in the United States Supreme Court. For an analysis of the Supreme Court, 
see generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); and LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES 
JUSTICES MAKE (1998). For an analysis of the federal appellate courts, see generally VIRGINIA A. 
HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL 
COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING (2007).  
170 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L. REV. 
469, 469-70 (1998). 
171 See Wendy L. Martinek, Judges as Members of Small Groups (“[J]udges serving on appellate 
courts may squabble like children, bond like family, or behave toward one another in a more 
detached, professional manner, but both anecdotal and systematic evidence make clear that there 
is an affective component to the interactions between and among judges serving on appellate 
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These studies indicate behavioral findings such as “panel effects,”173 
polarization, and “groupthink”174 in which judges participating in a group 
decision concur with judicial outcomes that they would not have 
pronounced on their own—a behavioral phenomenon that can generally be 
referred to as “conformity effects.”175 The group context of judicial 
decisionmaking can therefore influence judicial outcomes through cognitive 
channels, although the scope of this influence is still unclear. 
Perhaps most troubling among the various conformity effects is the 
evidence from empirical research suggesting that the status of particular 
bench members can disproportionately influence the decisions of other 
members. Formal leadership (e.g., the position of chief justice or chair of a 
judicial division) as well as social leadership roles in courts can influence 
the independence of judicial colleagues’ opinions, reducing the likelihood of 
dissent.176 This influence is only to be expected, and it casts doubts on the 
idea that a group of judges can better approximate the correct result. One 
recent study found that judges in criminal appeals in one domestic court 
were fifty percent more likely to vote for defendants when a particular 
justice did not preside than when he did.177 It should be emphasized that 
this study examined a court in which each sitting judge was obliged to 
determine his or her individual position on the verdict in the form of a 
vote; in other words, a separate opinion was mandatory (but without a 
                                                                                                                           
courts.” (citation omitted)), in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, supra note 
153, at 73, 75. 
172 To be sure, this is another area where the lines between cognitive and sociological research 
tend to blur in terms of social psychology. As previously noted, Goodman and Jinks have written 
extensively on the pressures to conform in different international law contexts, with reference to 
cognitive effects. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
173 See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An 
Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1329-31 (2009) (finding that the 
behavior of judges on a federal appeals panel is better explained as reflexive to the preferences of 
other members on the panel than as strategic to the possibility of being overruled on appeal). 
174 See, e.g., Melissa L. Breger, Making Waves or Keeping the Calm?: Analyzing the Institutional 
Culture of Family Courts Through the Lens of Social Psychology Groupthink Theory, 34 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 67-68 (2010) (arguing that “groupthink” negatively affects family court 
proceedings). 
175 See Martinek, supra note 171, at 82 (“[I]ndividuals participating in group decision making 
processes are susceptible to conformity effects. . . . [M]embers of a group care about the 
evaluations of their fellow group members . . . .”).  
176 See id. at 79 (describing the influence that formal leadership and characteristics such as 
collegiality or competence have on group decisionmaking); see also Haynie, supra note 160, at 1166 
(finding that the leadership of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court affected the likelihood of 
coming to a consensus). 
177 Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Group Decision Making on Appellate 
Panels: Presiding Justice and Opinion Justice Influence in the Israel Supreme Court, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 282, 282 (2013). 
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requirement of providing written reasons), not optional, ostensibly 
enhancing the possibility of dissent.178 
Another strand of research looks at the conformity effects of seniority 
on the bench. “Freshmen” judges can be disproportionality deferential to 
incumbents because they desire socialization and acceptance.179 They might 
also be treated paternalistically by senior judges,180 reducing their options 
for independent impact, even when the possibility of dissent exists. 
On this backdrop, we might ask, to what extent do leading WTO 
dispute settlement roles, such as panel chairs, or Appellate Body 
chairpersons, dominate the reports issued under consensus? Do they 
squelch dissent, as Lewis argues? Or are there dominant personalities in the 
panels and the Appellate Body that exercise social leadership, promoting 
collegiality but preventing the development of diverse and perhaps 
progressive or otherwise innovative solutions to problems in WTO law? 
Are “newbie” panelists or even Appellate Body members (many of whom 
arrive in Geneva with a wealth of prior professional experience, sometimes 
as arbitrators) sociologically and psychologically deterred from taking 
independent positions, let alone expressing them in dissenting or 
concurring opinions? Evidence substantiating the hypotheses on 
undesirable conformity effects could agitate in favor of the concern voiced 
by Lewis. 
It would be methodologically challenging to systematically collect such 
evidence. Qualitative empirical research based on semi-structured interviews 
of panelists, Appellate Body members, and attorneys and staff of the WTO 
secretariat would be one avenue,181 although constraints of confidentiality 
might restrict the knowledge gained to the level of anecdotal evidence, 
which to some extent already circulates among cognoscenti. There are other 
methods, however. Conformity effects in WTO dispute settlement—
specifically, the relative weight of panel chairs in determining outcomes—can 
                                                        
178 Id. at 286. 
179 See Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Acclimation Effects 
and Separate Opinion Writing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 792, 802 (2003) 
(exploring the “freshman effect” on separate opinion authorship). 
180 Cf. Saul Brenner & Timothy M. Hagle, Opinion Writing and Acclimation Effect, 18 POL. 
BEHAV. 235, 252-53 (1996) (explaining the decrease in the number of opinions written by Justice 
Rehnquist when he was elevated from Associate Justice to Chief Justice). 
181 On conducting such interviews with elite groups in political circumstances, see Joel D. 
Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews, 35 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 
673, 674-75 (2002). For a recent study in an international relations context addressing the 
possibility of expert rationality as well as the problem of overconfidence biases, see Emilie M. 
Hafner-Burton, D. Alex Hughes & David G. Victor, The Cognitive Revolution and the Political 
Psychology of Elite Decision Making, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 368, 370-78 (2013). 
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in fact be gleaned from existing quantitative research that has been 
conducted with respect to another long-standing debate in international 
judicial design: whether rulings rendered by adjudicators appointed ad hoc 
are of lower quality than those by permanent or standing judiciaries. As 
already noted, WTO panelists are appointed ad hoc, while appeals are 
made to the standing Appellate Body. Proposals have been made to create a 
permanent panel body in the WTO.182 Proponents of such a standing body 
often claim that permanent arbitrators or panelists, as the case may be, will 
improve the quality of decisions because they will gain experience by virtue 
of their permanent status.183 Thus, it has been argued that more 
experienced panelists will yield higher quality panel decisions, as indicated 
by a reduced rate of reversals made by the Appellate Body.184 Yet in a 
quantitative study, Marc Busch and Krzysztof Pelc have shown that the 
experience of panelists, in general, has no statistical effect on the likelihood 
of panel rulings being reversed.185 However, when the panel chairs are 
experienced, rulings are far less likely to be reversed by the WTO 
Appellate Body.186 This strongly suggests that panel chairs have a 
disproportionate role in panel outcomes (although no similar indications 
exist with respect to the Appellate Body). It also shows a high degree of 
acculturation to the system over time. 
To be sure, this additional, empirically based knowledge does not 
resolve the normative debate regarding the lack of dissent in the WTO. 
Indeed, those opposed to increased expressions of dissent would argue that 
it merely emphasizes the importance of consensus gathered around 
experienced chairs who can promote the quality of panel rulings. There is 
no need, however, to take a position on this question here. For present 
purposes, the hypotheses raised by behavioral research on courts as small 
decisionmaking groups are clearly relevant to international tribunals, in this 
case demonstrating the effects of cognitive elements on judicial dissent in 
the WTO, with implications for the quality of judicial decisions. 
                                                        
182 See generally William J. Davey, The Case for a WTO Permanent Panel Body, 6 J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 177 (2003) (exploring the case for and against a permanent WTO panel body). 
183 See, e.g., id. at 179-80 (“A permanent panel body would ensure a greater level of expertise 
since its members would over time serve on many panels and thus be better able to deal with the 
increased complexity of WTO dispute settlement.”). 
184 Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Contribution of the European Communities 
and Its Member States to the Improvement of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/1, 
at 2 (Mar. 13, 2002) (suggesting that permanent panels would result in fewer reversals, thereby 
reducing time, workload, and costs). 
185 Marc L. Busch & Krzysztof J. Pelc, Does the WTO Need a Permanent Body of Panelists?, 12 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 579, 591 (2009). 
186 Id. at 591-92. 
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C. The Individual: Target Selection, Framing Effects, and Preference 
Reversals in International Humanitarian Law 
International humanitarian law (IHL)—the “jus in bello”—is a branch of 
public international law that imposes significant restrictions on the use of 
violence by military forces during international (and noninternational) 
armed conflict, through a mix of treaty and custom.187 Among IHL’s most 
fundamental elements are the complementary principles of military 
necessity and proportionality.188 Both of these principles require military 
commanders (acting individually or in very small decisionmaking groups or 
“cells,” as is often the case in practice)189 to make judgment calls, either in 
the heat of battle or in more deliberate, strategic settings. Such targeting 
decisions involve a combination of operational and legal factors that 
amount to a kind of cost–benefit analysis necessarily performed under 
conditions of uncertainty—the Clausewitzian fog of battle190—and 
therefore provide an exceptionally appropriate area for research involving 
legal standards, cognitive psychology of individuals, and empirical, even 
experimental, research. 
Under the IHL principle of military necessity, attacks must be directed 
at military objectives (i.e., objectives that cumulatively make an effective 
contribution to the adversary’s military action and whose destruction or 
neutralization offers a definite military advantage).191 Under the IHL 
principle of proportionality, it is recognized that an attack against a military 
objective may cause “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,” but this damage must 
                                                        
187 See generally THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Dieter Fleck 
ed., 2d ed. 2008) (describing the development and application of international humanitarian law). 
188 See LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED 
CONFLICT: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN THE LAW OF 
WAR 36-40, 51-53 (2013).  
189 See, e.g., Tony Montgomery, Legal Perspective from the EUCOM Targeting Cell, 78 INT’L L. 
STUD. 189, 190-95 (2002), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/kosovo_legal.pdf 
(describing the process used to determine military targets). 
190 See John Ferris & Michael I. Handel, Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty and the Art of 
Command in Military Operations, 10 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SECURITY 1, 1-2 (1995) (describing 
the “inability to collect accurate, relevant and complete data about the battlefield, and on one’s 
own forces no less than on the enemy”). 
191 See Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian 
Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 798-805 (2010) (describing the balance 
between military necessity and respect for humanity and the codification of international 
humanitarian law). The principle has deep historical roots. See Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, 
Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 213, 215 (1998) (describing the historical origins of the military necessity principle). 
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not be “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.”192 
In other words, under IHL, military commanders must assess the 
potential for a military advantage proffered by a contemplated attack on a 
military target and balance this advantage against the possible harm to 
civilian objects (often referred to as “collateral damage”). Not surprisingly, 
however, the assessment of both sides of this equation is rife with 
speculation and subjectivity.193 Moreover, the content of these tests remains 
vague and problematic in its application, both ex ante and ex post, for 
example in the context of “targeted killings”194 and drone attacks195 or the 
choice between aerial attacks of different types (e.g., “precision” versus 
“area” bombings)196 or the option of more accurate—but more dangerous—
methods of ground incursions (e.g., “boots on the ground”). 
This vagueness has led some jurists to establish the notion of the 
“reasonable military commander” as a normative benchmark that can be 
seen as an objective—perhaps minimum—standard of conduct with respect 
to operative decisions such as targeting. A committee established to advise 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) regarding the legal aspects of NATO attacks in Kosovo 
in the late 1990s197 had this to say on the applicable legal standard: 
                                                        
192 Protocol I, supra note 145, art. 51.5(b). The Protocol is not conventionally binding upon all 
states, but these provisions can be taken, at least for present purposes, to be a concise formulation 
of the principle of proportionality in customary international law. 
193 There are models for estimating collateral damage that are employed at some levels. See, 
e.g., Steven C. Gordon & Douglas D. Martin, Modeling and Simulation for Collateral Damage Estimation 
in Combat, 5805 PROC. SPIE 309, 309 (2005), available at http://proceedings.spiedigitallibrary.org/ 
proceeding.aspx?articleid=864347 (describing how modeling is used to minimize predicted 
collateral damage in a combat situation); Jeffrey H. Grotte, A Targeting Model that Minimizes 
Collateral Damage, 25 NAVAL RES. LOGISTICS Q. 315, 315-16 (1978) (describing a mathematical 
model which prescribes the minimum and maximum amounts of damage allowed).  
194 See Amichai Cohen & Yuval Shany, A Development of Modest Proportions: The Application of 
the Principle of Proportionality in the Targeted Killings Case, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 310, 313-18 
(2007) (exploring the application of international humanitarian law—the principle of 
proportionality—to military operations involving targeted killing). 
195 The literature on drone warfare has grown exponentially over the last few years. See, e.g., 
Chris Jenks, Law from Above: Unmanned Aerial Systems, Use of Force, and the Law of Armed Conflict, 
85 N.D. L. REV. 649, 656-65 (2009) (analyzing the legality of drone strikes). 
196 For an account of this historical problem, see generally W. Hays Parks, ‘Precision’ and ‘Area’ 
Bombing: Who Did Which, and When?, 18 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 145 (1995).  
197 For accounts of the central issues, see generally W.J. Fenrick, Targeting and Proportionality 
During the NATO Bombing Campaign Against Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 489 (2001); and Daniel 
H. Joyner, The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive Paradigm, 13 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 597 (2002). 
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The answers to these questions are not simple. It may be necessary 
to resolve them on a case by case basis, and the answers may differ 
depending on the background and values of the decision maker. It 
is unlikely that a human rights lawyer and an experienced combat 
commander would assign the same relative values to military 
advantage and to injury to noncombatants. Further, it is unlikely 
that military commanders with different doctrinal backgrounds and 
differing degrees of combat experience or national military 
histories would always agree in close cases. It is suggested that the 
determination of relative values must be that of the “reasonable military 
commander”. Although there will be room for argument in close 
cases, there will be many cases where reasonable military commanders 
will agree that the injury to noncombatants or the damage to civilian 
objects was clearly disproportionate to the military advantage gained.198 
In many contexts, such a standard of reasonableness would be viewed as a 
legal fiction of sorts, or as an aspirational, normative test.199 By employing 
theories and methodologies from behavioral economics, applied to the 
relevant decisionmakers—military commanders, whose actions are 
attributable to states and, in certain circumstances, might bear international 
criminal responsibility for their own decisions—it should be possible to 
grant the reasonableness standard real meaning. This could enable us to 
draw the contours of an answer to what is essentially an empirical question 
with normative implications: who is the reasonable military commander? 
Interesting hypotheses in this respect arise from the study of cognitive 
framing effects that occur when alternative descriptions of the same 
decision problem give rise to different preferences.200 Experimental 
research on the psychology of risk-related decisionmaking has shown that 
individual decisionmakers’ preferences can shift when the same problem is 
framed in different ways. In the most foundational experimental proof of 
this behavioral bias, Tversky and Kahneman showed that subjects made 
different choices when the outcomes of their decisions were depicted as 
losses rather than gains (conforming to general Prospect Theory), even 
though they were essentially identical.201 The original Tversky and 
                                                        
198 FINAL REPORT TO THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW 
THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA ¶ 50 
(2000), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/10052. 
199 See Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative Perspective, 
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233, 1237-38 (2010) (describing American private and public law 
approaches to determining what constitutes a reasonable person). 
200 See supra note 57 (discussing framing effects). 
201 Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 57, at 453.  
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Kahneman experiment related to expenditure on health measures in the 
face of a deadly epidemic disease.202 It is not difficult to tweak this 
experiment to address military necessity and collateral damage. Might 
military commanders be susceptible to the same distortions of rationality? 
And if so, what are the implications for international law? Should the 
standard of “reasonable military commander” relating to proportionality in 
targeting decisions take into account the ways in which reasonableness 
diverges from perfect rationality? 
Consider, for example, the following general design of an experiment, 
closely following the Tversky and Kahneman framework. Two groups of 
subjects would be presented with the following hypothetical: 
Imagine that the enemy has stockpiled a significant quantity of 
strategic munitions in the basement of an apartment building that 
normally houses 200 civilians. As part of a military operation your 
unit has been assigned the mission of eliminating this stockpile. 
You have two alternative plans of action to choose from, both of 
which will eliminate the munitions. 
A first group of subjects would be posed with this question: 
If plan A—a manned aerial attack—is adopted, 80 civilians will 
survive. If plan B—an unmanned drone attack—is adopted, there is 
1/3 probability that all civilians will survive, and 2/3 probability that 
no civilians will survive. 
A second group of subjects would be posed with what is in essence the same 
scenario, but framed differently: 
If plan A—a manned aerial attack—is adopted, 120 civilians will 
die. If plan B—an unmanned drone attack—is adopted, there is 2/3 
probability that all civilians will die, and 1/3 probability that no 
civilians will die. 
If the differential framing has the same effect in this IHL context as it has 
elsewhere, we might hypothesize that the first group will prefer plan A, 
whereas the second group will prefer plan B. An outcome like this would be 
significant not only in the construction of the “reasonable military 
commander” as a bounded rational actor, but could also contribute to the 
design of military manuals. For example, the wording of guidelines matters 
not only for interpretation but also for cognition. Moreover, an experiment 
like this could test whether military commanders with different levels of 
                                                        
202 Id.  
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experience and training have developed rationality that overcomes the 
“trick” of framing effects by using different groups from among military 
commanders and civilians as subjects. This is only an indicative 
experiment.203 Many others could be constructed to test the rationality of 
military commanders in different circumstances and in comparison with 
other groups. Consider the following: subjects (playing the role of military 
commanders or simply representatives of the general public) are presented 
with two risky military operations. In scenario A, there is a 9/10 chance of 
achieving a small military gain (1, on a scale of 1 to 10 representing the 
absolute magnitude of a military gain), and a 1/10 chance of achieving 
nothing from the operation. In scenario B, there is a 1/10 chance of gaining 
a very significant military advantage (10 on the same scale) and a 1/10 
chance of gaining nothing. Subjects would then be asked (a) which 
alternative they would approve and (b) how much collateral damage would 
be justified in each option (i.e., the “price” of the operation, which can, 
under terms of proportionality, serve as a proxy for the expected military 
advantage, all things considered). Similarly constructed experiments have 
exposed the cognitive phenomenon of preference reversals: people may 
prefer gamble A but place a higher price tag on gamble B.204 Which of 
these calculi should be adopted as representative of a “reasonable military 
commander?” Perhaps military commanders are less prone to this cognitive 
weakness in rationality? 
Another issue begging for behavioral analysis is the question of force 
protection: to what extent should military forces take risks to prevent 
civilian harm? And is the reduction of risk to one’s own forces a legitimate 
factor in potentially increasing risk to civilians as part of the 
proportionality calculus?205 The normative issues involved are absorbing, 
                                                        
203 I highlight here the advantages of experimental research, but this does not in any way 
reduce the importance of field-based empirical research on similar topics. See, e.g., Fellmeth, supra 
note 6, at 133-34 (describing an empirical methodology to study military planning’s relationship 
with the proportionality principle, the minimization of the ratio of civilian to combatant 
causalities inflicted in conflicts). Moreover, experimental research and field studies can be 
mutually reinforcing, overcoming each other’s weaknesses. 
204 See David M. Grether & Charles R. Plott, Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference 
Reversal Phenomenon, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 623, 623 (1979) (describing an experiment showing that 
although test subjects preferred one lottery over another, they tended to place a higher value on 
the other, non-preferred lottery which had higher potential payouts but lower winning probability 
than the preferred lottery); see also Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic, Introduction to THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE 1, 20-22 (Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic eds., 2006) 
(providing an overview of various theories and explanations for preference reversal). 
205 See, e.g., David Luban, Risk Taking and Force Protection (describing various approaches by 
philosophers in evaluating the morality of increasing risk to civilians in order to reduce risk to 
military forces), in READING WALZER 277, 287-90 (Yitzhak Benbaji & Naomi Sussman eds., 2014). 
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but no less intriguing would be a study from which we might gain an 
understanding of how force protection factors into decisionmaking. In the 
preference reversal example just discussed, we could, for example, replace 
collateral damage with own-costs. But experiments taking into account all 
three factors—military advantage, collateral damage, and own losses in 
combat—could be designed. Thus, an experiment with relevant subjects 
might pose the following question: 
You are assessing the proportionality of an attack against key enemy 
personnel. You may choose between two modes of attack: Option A 
– aerial attack; and Option B – ground troop attack. 
A first group would be given the following alternative outcomes (the 
numbers expressing relative results on a scale of 1 to 10 reflecting the 
severity of collateral damage and the military gain, respectively): 
Option A – Civilians killed: 6; Military advantage: 7 
Option B – Civilians killed: 2; Military advantage: 10 
A second group would be fed the following information: 
Option A – Civilians killed: 6; Military advantage: 7; 
Soldiers killed: 10 
Option B – Civilians killed: 2; Military advantage: 10; 
Soldiers killed: 4 
And, finally, a third group would be presented with these options: 
Option A – Civilians killed: 6; Military advantage: 7; 
Soldiers killed: 4 
Option B – Civilians killed: 2; Military advantage: 10; 
Soldiers killed: 10 
Here, the hypothesis, or rather, the examined element of bounded 
rationality, would also be one of preference reversals. The relative 
evaluation of two different alternatives is affected by an exogenous factor. 
Note that all three groups are faced with the same outcomes in the strictest 
terms of proportionality: the number of civilians killed compared to the 
military advantage gained (i.e., without taking into account force protection 
considerations). The only difference between the three groups is the degree 
of harm caused to own forces. The first group has no data on this, the 
second group faces moderate damage, and the third a very high degree of 
harm. Moreover, Option B is clearly superior to Option A for all groups in 
terms of proportionality. Nevertheless, one might hypothesize that subjects 
in the third group would be put off by the high number of own casualties in 
  
1156  University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 1099 
 
Option B, preferring Option A and in essence reversing the preference. At 
the very least, this would show us that force protection is de facto taken 
into account as part of the proportionality calculus, with or without legal 
basis. In short, it appears that behavioral and experimental analysis has 
great potential to inform international humanitarian law, as well as other 
areas of international law in which individuals are key decisionmakers, such 
as international economic law and human rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The incorporation of insights from cognitive psychology and behavioral 
economics into the study of international law is a difficult but necessary 
next step in the evolution of a legal discipline. International law has, over 
the last two decades, engaged with the ever-increasing complexity and 
sophistication of other academic fields such as political science and 
economics. This Article has endeavored to set out a general yet 
comprehensive and systematic framework for taking that step, an 
intellectual invitation to add behavioral analysis to the international legal 
researcher’s toolbox. 
We have seen that there are methodological challenges involved, as a 
matter of course. Behavioral economics focuses on individual behavior, 
whereas international law is the domain of states, peoples, organizations, 
and other collectives, in addition to individuals. Behavioral economics is a 
field immersed in experimental and empirical research, which can be 
difficult, but very rewarding, to replicate in the international arena. 
Behavioral analysis also lacks the neat parsimony of traditional rational 
choice theorizing, which has gained a following among international legal 
researchers. These challenges are not, however, weaknesses, but rather 
strengths, as we struggle to better understand how international law works 
and how it interacts with human behavior in different settings and 
environments. As the examples in Part IV illustrate, there is much to study 
through behavioral analysis at the state, group, and individual levels. 
Theoretical applications, field studies, and experimental research are all 
methodologies that can be brought to bear on behavioral international law, 
in practically all subfields. Indeed, those examples—analysis of treaty 
development, the role of dissent in international tribunals, and cognitive 
biases in target selection in armed conflict—were of an almost minimal 
nature. The menu of possible research avenues is huge, as is the potential 
for gaining a richness and depth that currently only exists in a small, but 
promising segment of empirical work relating to international law. Areas of 
general concern—such as sources of international law, state responsibility, 
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and enforcement—as well as a host of specialized issues—from the 
structure of concessions in international agreements on trade in services to 
derogations in human rights treaties—beckon for empirically grounded 
behavioral research. Indeed, empiricism could benefit any area of 
international law in which individual decisionmaking comes into play. 
The challenge now is to design and execute rigorous empirical research 
programs that can illuminate behavioral deviations from rationality in 
decisionmaking that bear upon international legal problems, ideally through 
intensive collaborations between researchers and scholars with 
complementary training. However, as much as there is room for enthusiasm 
toward the advent of behavioral international law, there is also a crucial 
need to exercise caution and avoid any sweeping claims about international 
law. To avoid the difficulties in gaining acceptance and legitimacy that other 
theoretical approaches to international law (such as rational choice) have 
faced, a behavioral approach to international law must be pursued with both 
methodological meticulousness and intellectual humility. 
 
 
